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INTRODUCTION

Suppose an investor, six months ago, bought a block of shares in a
public offering by a booming high technology firm. The firm's published financial reports and its registration statement depicted strong
past and potential earnings growth. The reports were largely
fabrications, however, and yesterday, as the firm filed for reorganization under the bankruptcy laws, it became obvious that its assets would
not satisfy ordinary creditors' claims, much less leave any residual equity for shareholders. Consequently, the investor files a class action
against the firm and its management' seeking rescission and damages
under the federal securities laws.
Even if the investor were to win in court or obtain a settlement, 2 he
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1. Possible defendants include directors, officers, outside lawyers and accountants. See general/, § II(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976); § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), as implemented by Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.

§240.lOb-5 (1982).
2. Actual litigation of the securities law claims againstthefirm will be suspended as a result
of the automatic stay in bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(1),(7), 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a)(1),(7) (Supp. V 1981). The investor may petition to have the stay lifted, however, and

may participate in the reorganization proceedings in the hopes of obtaining provision for his
claims in the reorganization plan.
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may face great difficulty in recovering any money from the firm itself.
The firm's general creditors will argue that, as a shareholder, the investor accepted the risks of an equity position in return for an opportunity
to participate in profits. The creditors will contend that it is unfair to
let the investor shed this risk and seek general creditor status because of
bankruptcy. The investor will argue that general maxims of bankruptcy give a debtor's unsecured creditors equal footing in recovery,
whether their claims sound in tort, breach of contract, or some other
cause of adtion; therefore, why should shareholder fraud victims receive different treatment from that accorded other tort claimants, such
as a pedestrian hit by the bankrupt's delivery truck? This latter argument has been advocated on behalf of the investor by the Securities
3
and Exchange Commission.
Given the recurring nature of problems resembling those
presented in this hypothetical,4 it is not surprising that Congress sought
to resolve these problems by statute when it enacted the comprehensive
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.5 The congressional solution 6 was to
3. See, eg., Memorandum for the Securities & Exchange Commission, at 19 n.19, Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414 (1968); SEcuRmrs & EXCHANaE COMM., REPORT ON
S.235 AND S.236, reprintedin The Bankruptcy Reform Act, Hearingson S.235 andS.236 Before the
SubconmL on Improvements in JudicialMach of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 738-79 (1975). [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVISION, 1975 Senate
Hearings]. The latter report represented the SEC's views on the legislation eventually enacted as
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The House of
Representatives received a similar report, reprinted in BankruptcyActRevislo Hearingson H.R.
31 andH.1&32 Bf/ore the Subcomm on Civiland ConstitutionalRights ofthe House Comm on the
Judicary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2164-2208 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVISION, 1976 HouseHearings]. The discussion of securities law claims subordination is
identical in the two reports. See SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPrCY REVISION, 1975 Senate Hearings,
supra, at 759-60; SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVISION, 1976 HouseHearings,supra, at 218486.
4. Examples include the reorganizations of Westec Corp., Four Seasons'Nursing Centers of
America, Inc., and Equity Funding Corp. of America; the liquidation of Stirling Homex Corp.;
and two of the largest bank failures in the country's history, Franklin Nat'l Bank in New York
and United States Natel Bank in San Diego. Securities law class actions are currently pending in
connection with the reorganizations of AM Int'l Inc., Itel Corp., Lionel Corp., Saxon Industries
and Wickes Companies. In 1975 the SEC noted that 40% of the Chapter X reorganizations in
which it entered an appearance between 1972 and 1974 involved a concurrent or antecedent SEC
action under the securities laws. See SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVISION, 1975 Senate Hear.
ings, supra note 3, at 760 n.48; SEC REPORT ON BANKRuPTcY REVISION, 1976 House Hearings,
rumpra note 3, at 2185 n.48 (22 of 55 reorganizations).
5. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). In general the act applies to proceedings commenced on or after October 1, 1979.
6. Congress accepted the recommendation of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States on this point. The Commission, created by Congress in 1970 to undertake a
comprehensive reform of the bankruptcy laws, issued its final report on July 30, 1973. REPORT OF
THE CoMMIssION ONum BANKRurpTCY LAws OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,

93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). Part H of the report sets forth the text of the Commission's proposed
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mandate a blanket subordination of securities laws claims in section
510(b) of the new Bankruptcy Code:
Any claim for recission [sic] of a purchase or sale of a security of
the debtor or of an affiliate or for damages arising from the purchase
or sale of such a security shall be subordinated for purposes of distribution to all claims and interests that are7 senior or equal to the claim
or interest represented by such security.
In the reorganization of a large, publicly held corporation, the allocation of millions of dollars may turn on whether securities law claimants
can participate as general creditors. In terms of the goals of contemporary securities regulation, the subordination doctrine goes to the heart
of the compensatory objective embodied in the various securities law
remedies. Although such remedies have proven valuable to securityholders in a great many cases in which the issuer was solvent, it is the
bankruptcy cases in which the fraud is likely to be the most acute and
•the fraud-caused losses to securityholders the greatest."
This article criticizes Congress' decision in favor of subordination.
Part I traces the historical development of the subordination doctrine
and examines the events leading to its codification in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. Part II considers both traditional and new arguments supporting the doctrine and concludes that these rationales do
not justify subordination of a shareholder's otherwise valid claim for
loss in investment value attributable to the fraud. Part III then considers how to allocate the total fraud-caused loss in the investment value
of the firm between its debt and equity claimants. It concludes that a
rule of parity-that is, permitting securities law claimants to participate
statute [hereinafter cited as Commission Proposal], entitled the "Bankruptcy Act of 1973," which

provides the basis for the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Section 4-406(a)(1) of the Commission
Proposal provided for subordination of securities law claims. See infra note 43 and accompanying
text.
The Commission's recommendation regarding securities law claims appears to have generated little outside interest during the legislative consideration of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. This
comes as something of a surprise given the recurring nature of the issue and the amount of money
typically at stake. Other than the SEC, there were no strong critics of the subordination proposal,
Several groups made comments on the proposal, but it is a fair conclusion from a review of their
statements and testimony that these groups did not attach a particularly high priority to it. The
typical treatment of §-406(aXl) was one sentence in a multi-page statement, submitted by an
interested group, saying without elaboration that the group favored subordination.
7. 11 U.S.C. §510(b) (Supp. V 1981). Throughout this article, the new bankruptcy law,
codified at 11 U.S.C. §§101-151,326 (Supp. V 1981), will be referred to as the "Bankruptcy Code."
The predecessor bankruptcy law, codified at 11 U.S.C. §§1- 1103 (1976), will be referred to as the
"Bankruptcy Act."
8. Furthermore, in bankruptcy cases the issuer is more likely to be the sole viable defendant
for recoveries. It is easier to recover ajudgment from the officers of a solvent company than from
the officers of Equity Funding, Stirling Homex, or Four Seasons. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
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on a par with other unsecured creditor claimants--produces allocations
that are better for public policy and fairer than the allocations produced by the subordination doctrine. This conclusion is qualified, however, by the requirement that the mesure of the securities law claims
entitled to parity should be limited to the amount of fraud-caused loss. 9
I. BACKGROUND OF THE SUBORDINATION DOCTRINE

A. The Development of an American Rule.
In adopting section 510(b) Congress did not write on a clean slate;
for over one hundred years judges have directed considerable attention
to the conflict between an insolvent issuer's creditors and defrauded
shareholders. Early cases typically involved shareholders' attempts to
rescind in order to escape liability on their shares, as opposed to the
efforts of modem shareholders to rescind so as to participate in the
allocation of the issuer's assets. In these early cases, the British courts
held-based in part on language in the then applicable companies statute'O-that a shareholder lost any right to rescind his subscription for
fraud once winding-up proceedings began." In effect, winding up
2
"crystallized" the fraud victim's status as a shareholder.'
The earliest American cases followed this British lead and regularly denied relief to the shareholder.' 3 As Judge Dillon, later a prominent New York corporate lawyer, concluded in one of these cases,
"[t]hese [British] decisions are doubtless in some degree influenced by
the special provisions of the companies' act, particularly that of 1862,
but the general course of reasoning therein is applicable to cases of
insolvent or bankrupt corporations in this country."' 4 Thus, lacking
the statutory authority available to their British counterparts, American
judges resorted to general principles of equity and then-developing
conceptual notions about the fundamental.relationship between share9. This article is intended as the first part of a two-part project dealing with the treatment of
securities law claims in bankruptcy. The planned second part will examine the practical workings
of section 510(b) and how to possibly implement the conclusions reached herein. For now, it

should be noted that although the legal arguments presented in this article depict subordination
and parity as black-or-white alternatives, the more realistic view is that they are endpoints on a
spectrum of potential results that may be produced through the bankruptcy reorganization bargaining process.
10. Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89.
11. The decision of the House of Lords settling this issue was Oakes v. Turquand, 2 L.R.-E.
& I. App. 325 (1867). See also Henderson v. Royal British Bank, 119 Eng. Rep. 1279 (Q.B. 1857)
(similar result under earlier statute).
12. Homby, Book Review, 71 LAw Q. REv.-415, 416-17 (1955).
13. It is difficult, but possible, to find a stray exception. See, e.g., Litchfield Bank v. Peck, 29
Conn. 384 (1860).
14. Upton v. Englehart, 28 F. Cas. 835, 838 (C.C.D. Iowa 1874)(No. 16,800).
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holder and creditor in disallowing rescission. For example, many
courts held that the shareholder had failed to prove his diligence in
detecting the fraud or, upon discovering it, in repudiating his subscrip-

tion.' 5 Other opinions seem simply to hold that after insolvency, as a
matter of law, a shareholder could not invoke the fraud to avoid liabil-

6
ity to the corporation's creditors.'

This early solicitude for creditors arose in part from the then-ac-

cepted theory that corporate capital comprised a "trust fund" for the
payment of corporate debts. The implications of this theory were that
creditors obtained something akin to an equitable charge against the

"fund" represented by the shareholders' capital and could, therefore,
limit withdrawal of the "fund" from the corporation.' 7 Thus applied,

the trust fund analogy represented a strong judicial reluctance to permit intracorporate controversies or arrangements, such as the fraud of a
corporate agent, to compromise the integrity of the firm's staod capital.
By the turn of the century, however, courts had begun to discard
the broad trust fund analogy, focusing instead on creditor reliance.' 8 If

the expectations of individual creditors deserved primary protection,
the defrauded shareholder's right to relief needed limiting only to accommodate those expectations; only those creditors who could have relied on the particular shareholder's subscription-generally creditors

whose claims arose after the subscription--deserved a superior claim
15. See, e.g., Oglivie v. Knox Ins. Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 380, 390-91 (1860); Farrar v.

Walker, 8 F. Cas. 1076, 1078 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1875)(No. 4,679); Upton v. Englehart, 28 F. Cas. 835
(C.C.D. Iowa 1874)(No. 16,800); Howard v. Turner, 155 Pa. 349, 26 A. 753 (1893); Weisiger v.
Richmond-Ice Mach. Co, 90 Va. 795, 20 S.E. 361 (1894).
16. See, e-g., Michener v. Payson, 17 F. Cas. 259 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1875)(No. 9,524); Howard v.
Glenn, 85 Ga. 238, 11 S.E. 610 (1890); Dettra v. Kestner, 147 Pa. 566, 23 A. 889 (1892).
17. See, eg., Sanger v. Upton, 91 U.S. 56, 60 (1875):
The capital stock of an incorporated company is a fund set apart for the payment of its
debts. It is a substitute for the personal liability which subsists in private copartnerships.
When debts are incurred, a contract arises with the creditors that it shall not be withdrawn or applied, otherwise than upon their demands, until such demands are satisfied.
The creditors have a lien upon it in equity. If diverted, they may follow it as far as it can
be traced, and subject it to the payment of their claims, except as against holders who
have taken it bonafide for a valuable consideration and without notice. It is publicly
pledged to those who deal with the corporation, for their security.
Credit for originating the principle belongs to Justice Story, writing as Circuit Justice in the
case of Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)(No. 17,944), in which a bank distributed assets equal to three-quarters of its capital stock to shareholders. The distribution rendered
the bank insolvent. Adopting the trust analogy, the court permitted creditors to follow the assets
into the hands of shareholders and recover from them. For discussions of the trust-fund doctrine
in fraud cases see Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875); Fear v. Bartlett, 81 Md. 435, 32 A. 322
(1895) (doctrine does not apply unless corporation dissolved or insolvent).
18. The doctrinal, vagaries of the trust fund analogy led to its ultimate rejection. See generally B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL 46 (2d ed. 1981); Hunt, The Truat
Fund 7heory and Some SubstittesForIt, 12 YALE LJ. 63 (1902); Warren, Safeguardingthe Credtors of Corporations,36 HARtv. L. REv. 509, 544-46 (1923).
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on the capital contributed by that shareholder.1 9 Thus, by the 1930s,
the dominant rule in this country allowed the shareholder to rescind,
even after insolvency. The courts then simply deferred his claim to any
claims by persons who extended credit after, and presumably in reli-

ance on, his subscription. 20 Usually, however, the claims of subsequent
creditors consumed- the corporation's remaining assets, so the shareholder often fared no better under the emerging American doctrine

than under its English predecessor. 21
Nevertheless, various procedural niceties made possible by this
doctrinal change aided the American shareholder. One leading opinion suggested that, at least in the case of trade creditors whose relationship with the corporation predated the subscription at issue, additional
evidence of reliance in combination with subsequent credit was necessary to establish reliance on the subscription. 22 Moreover, the courts of
several jurisdictions held that because the basis for deferring the shareholder's claim was creditor reliance, a matter peculiar to individual
creditors, a receiver, who theoretically stood in the shoes of the corporation, could not assert the creditor's position. 23 Thus, the American
19. Probably the most influential decision was Newton Nat'l Bank v. Newbegin, 74 F. 135
(8th Cir. 1896). In a review of prior law, the court noted that every case denying a right to rescind
had involved either a shareholder failing to act diligently, a shareholder actively participating in
management of the corporation, or debts contracted by the corporation after the subscription.
Thus the court held that when no considerable amount of corporate indebtedness had been created since the subscription had been made, rescission should be allowed even after insolvency. ld
at 140. This focus on subsequent creditors and departure from the trust analogy closely paralleled
the more celebrated rejection of the trust fund doctrine in the context of liability for watered stock.
See Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 274, 50 N.W. 1117 (1892).
20. See, eg., MacNamee v. Bankers' Union for Foreign Commerce & Fin., Inc., 25 F.2d 614
(2d Cir. 1928); Jagels v. Cox, 50 Idaho 67, 294 P. 515 (1930); Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90,
245 P. 977 (1926); Atwood v. McKenzie-Waterhouse Co., 120 Wash. 214, 206 P. 978 (1922). For
comprehensive collections of American cases on the question, see Arnot., 41 A.L.R. 674 (1926);
Annot. 46 A.L.R. 484 (1927); 4 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§1707-1721 (perm. ed. 1965).
21. See, ag., In re Morris Bros., Inc., 282 F. 670 (D. Ore. 1922), q9'd, 293 F. 294 (9th Cir.
1923); Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 206 N.W. 586 (1925).
22. Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 111-15, 245 P. 977, 985-86 (1926). Professors Dodd
and Baker have noted that this case was settled upon remand; thus, the quantum of additional
evidence necessary was presumably never litigated. E. M. DODD & R. BAKER, CASES AND
MATERIA S ON CORPORATIONS 760 (2d ed. 1951).

23. The doctrine applied whether the receiver sought to collect an unpaid subscription or to
resist restitution of the paid purchase price. See Florida Land & Improvement Co. v. Merrill, 52
F. 77 (5tf Cir. 1892); People v. California Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 19 Cal. App. 414, 126 P. 516
(1912); Marion Trust Co. v. Blish, 170 Ind. 686, 84 N.E. 814 (1908); Kentucky Mut. Ins. Co.'s
Assignee v. Schaeffer, 120 Ky. 227, 85 S.W. 1098 (1905); Ham v. Smith, 85 Okla. 137, 204 P. 642
(1921). Seegenerally S. HIoH, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF RECEIVERS §§ 245,315 (4th ed. 1910);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 173 commentj (1937). Some courts did adopt a contrary rule
allowing the receiver to assert the rights of individual creditors as well as those of the corporation.
See Lex v. Selway Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 206 N.W. 586 (1925); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v.
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rule not only provided the defrauded shareholder an opportunity to
litigate the merits of his fraud claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, it
also allowed him to raise procedural obstacles that may have significantly improved his settlement position. And in the few cases in which
corporate assets could pay general creditor claims in full, it gave him
priority over his nonvictimized counterparts. 24
B. The Oppenheimer decision.
By the first part of this century, the American rule had achieved
acceptance in most United States jurisdictions. Because of eventual
economic prosperity and rising stock markets, and because of the long
dry spell in private actions under the federal securities laws,25 the rule
was not directly relitigated for five decades. During these quiet years,
however, one case, Oppenheimer v. HarrimanNational Bank and Trust
Co. ,26 is worth noting because it provides the most recent Supreme

Court language on the subordination question, language relied on by
the Securities and Exchange Commission for its position prior to the
enactment of section 510(b).
Before 1937, shareholders in national banks were personally liable
for bank obligations up to the par value of their shares. 27 Accordingly,
when the Harriman Bank failed in 1933, Oppenheimer, a shareholder
of the bank, was assessed the full par value of his shares, which he duly
paid into the receivership. He then sued to rescind his share purchase
for fraud.28 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a
Geer, 233 Mich. 577, 207 N.W. 883 (1926); Burningham v. Burke, 67 Utah 90, 245 P. 977 (1926).

There would seem to be little doubt concerning a trustee in bankruptcy's power to assert the rights
of the subsequent creditors. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 70c, 70e, 11 U.S.C. § I10(c),(e) (1976); Bankruptcy Code § 544, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (Supp. V 1981); In re Desnoyers Shoe Co., 210 F. 533, 539
(S.D. IML 1914), aI'd, 224 F. 373 (7th Cir. 1915); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Nichols, 199 Mich.
126, 165 N.W. 667 (1917).
24. As to the last point, see MacNamee v. Bankers' Union for Foreign Commerce & Fin.,
Inc., 25 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1928); Stalnaker v. Gum, 87 W. Va. 283, 104 S.E. 730 (1920). For an
indication that the British rule was to the contrary see In re Hull & County Bank (Burgess's Case),
15 Ch. D. 507 (1880).
25. See 3 L Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1684-92 (2d ed. 1961).
26. 301 U.S. 206 (1937).
27. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 12, 13 Stat. 102 (1864); Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 23,38
Stat. 273 (1913). Both statutes were repealed by Act of Sept. 8, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-230, § 7, 73
Stat. 457.
28. Oppenheimer chose this procedural course because the Supreme Court had earlier settled
that a bank shareholder could not escape his statutory liability by pleading fraud. Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U.S. 536 (1901); Scott v. Deweese 181 U.S. 202 (1901). For a comparable result with

respect to a state statutory liability provision see Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust
Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148 N.E. 609 (1925). Consequently, Oppenheimer did not contest the statutory assessment and sought to recover only the amount paid for his shares. Brief for Petitioner at
4, Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 301 U.S. 206 (1937).
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district court judgment which denied the rescission, but also held that

Oppenheimer could collect his claim only from assets remaining after
full payment of the bank's pre-insolvency creditors 29-a result contrary
30
to the law of two other circuits.

Ina unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on the subordination issue. Without

alluding to the vast body of subordination case law outside of the national bank context, the Court disposed of the issue in less than one
paragraph. 31 Two special circumstances apparently influenced its decision. First, Oppenheimer had paid for his shares out of funds deposited at the bank, so that but for the purchase of the shares he would

have remained a general creditor. Second, by paying both the par
value for his shares and his statutory assessment, Oppenheimer had, in

effect, acknowledged and fully discharged his entire liability to other
Harriman Bank creditors. 32 These circumstances and the general tenor
of the Court's opinion leave little room for reading Oppenheimer as a

general rejection of the American rule of subordination.
C.

The SEC, Slain andKripke, andthe Rebirth of Absolute
Subordination.

At about the same time as the Harriman Bank failure and Oppenheimer's suit, Congress enacted the federal securities laws which provide the principal source of modem shareholders'

remedies. 33

Congress seemed to ignore, however, the subordination question-a
point not lost on contemporary commentators. 34 Moreover, the ques29. Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 85 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1936), ree'd,301
U.S. 206 (1937).
30. Both the First and Third Circuits had permitted the bank shareholder to participate ratably with the bank's general creditors. Clark v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 84 F.2d 607 (ist
Cir. 1936) (claimant had been defrauded into accepting bank stock as collateral for a loan to a
third party); Salter v. Williams, 244 F. 126 (3d Cir. 1917), appealdirmissed, 250 U.S. .53 (1919).
31. Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 301 U.S. 206, 208 (1937). The Court
cited six cases in this portion of its opinion. These included the Salter and the two Clark cases
referred to in supra note 30, as well as the FloridaLand & Improvement case mentioned in supra
note 23 in connection with the receiver's power to assert the rights of individual creditors. The
others were Richardson v. Oliver, 105 F. 277 (5th Cir. 1900), holding that a bank depositor-even
though also a bank shareholder--could recover from the bank's receiver a deposit made when the
bank's officers knew of its insolvency, and Williams v. Green, 23 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1928), holding
that in an action by a bank's receiver on a note given in payment of bank stock, the maker could
defend on the ground that a bank officer had fraudulently induced the purchase and thus the bank
had received the note with notice of the fraud.
32. See 301 U.S. at 214-15.
33. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
34. For example, one writer included in his list of criticisms of the Securities Act of 1933 that
"bona fide bondholders, merchandise creditors, and commercial bank creditors may have to share
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tion apparently was not actively litigated in the courts, at least in terms
of producing reported opinions, until the late 1970s. 35 The issue, however, did arise occasionally. A review of the Securities and Exchange
Commission'sAnnual Reports reveals the presence of the issue, prior to
the 1970s, in several corporate reorganizations under Chapter X of the
former Bankruptcy Act. Under Chapter X the SEC played an active
role in reorganizations; 36 it had the right to be heard on all matters
arising in the proceeding, 37 and if the claims against the debtor ex-

ceeded three million dollars, the judge was required to refer the plan of
reorganization to the SEC for an advisory report prior to approving
it.38

Exercising its authority under these provisions, the SEC took the
position that shareholder claims based on violations of the securities

laws had to be given parity with other unsecured claims39 and conthe company's assets with common stockholders just because there was an unavoidable mistake in
the [prospectus]." Seligman, Amend the SecuritiesAct, 153 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 370, 379 (1934).
Another suggested that the British unwillingness to extend statutory liability for inaccuracies in
prospectuses to issuers, see Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 37(1), stemmed from a
concern for the intervening rights of creditors. Barnett, The Securities Act of 1933 and the British
CompanlesAct, 13 HARV. Bus. REv. 1, 8 (1934). In an article written the next year, Professor
Kessler surveyed continental legal systems and noted a similar tendency to limit the shareholder's
right to rescission and damages against the corporation in the interests of corporate creditors.
Kessler, The American SecuritiesAct and itsForeign Counterparts A ComparativeStudy, 44 YALE
UJ. 1133, 1156-62 (1935). In contrast, section 11 of the American Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §77k (1976), which was otherwise closely modeled on the British statute, see Companies
Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 37, not only included the issuer among a long list of prospective defendants, including directors, certain officers ofthe issuer, underwriters and various experts,
see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(aXl)-(5) (1976); of Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 37(1)
(liability only for directors, promoters, and persons who authorize the issue of the prospectus), but
also made the issuer's liability the strictest of all by denying it "due diligence" and other defenses,
Securities Act § ll(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976). In addition, section 12 of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1976), allows a purchaser of securities to recover from his immediate seller, which in a
given case may be the issuer.
35. The lone exception is SEC v. Insurance Investors Trust Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,259 (W.D. Ky. 1971), involving the receivership of an unregistered
investment company. Relying on the Oppenheimer decision and influenced in part by the apparent indifference of the investment company's other creditors, the court held that purchasers of the
company's shares, if successful on the. merits of their claims under the securities laws, could participate in the assets of the receivership as general creditors.
36. Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379
U.S. 594, 613 (1965), the SEC had also occasionally participated in arrangement proceedings
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act when public investors were involved.
37. Bankruptcy Act §207, 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1976).
38. Otherwise, referral to the SEC was discretionary. Bankruptcy Act §§ 171-173, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 571-573 (1976).
39. See Memorandum for the Securities & Exchange Commission, at 19 n.19; Protective
Comm. v. Anderson, 390-U.S. 414, 437 n.19 (1968).
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tested plans that denied participation to such shareholder claims.'n
More frequently the trustee-perhaps influenced by the prospect of
SEC challenge-would compromise the defrauded shareholders'
claims for a fraction of their face value. On this basis, shareholder
to share in the bankrupt corporation's asfraud victims were permitted
41
sets despite its insolvency.
In July 1973, the publication of the Report of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States abruptly reversed this trend
of shareholder participation. 42 As part of a sweeping provision on the
subordination of claims, the Commission proposed that investor claims
based on federal and state securities legislation, and similar laws, be
subordinated in payment to all general creditor claims.43 The Commission's Report contained no explanation for this proposal, but the impetus is likely to have come from a law review article written during the
Commission's tenure by Professors John J. Slain and Homer Kripke. 44
40. See eg., SEC v. Templar, 405 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1969) (reorganization of General
United Corp.); Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 364 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1966) (reorganization of
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc.), rev'don othergrounds, 390 U.S. 414 (1968). In neither case did the court
reach the merits of whether successful shareholder fraud claimants could share as general creditors, and in its opinion in Anderson the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider the
claims. 390 U.S. at 453. One year earlier the Court had also declined to consider questions regarding the priority of rescission claims by securityholders-that time, holders of withdrawable
capital shares in a savings and loan' association-on grounds of prematurity. Tcherepnin v.
Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 346 (1967).
41. The cases of Four Seasons Nursing Centers of America and Equity Funding Corp. of
America provide examples. Four Seasons went public in the "hot issue" days of May, 1968. Its
stock soared from $1 per share to the equivalent of S181.50 per share in 18 months before collapsing nine months later. In reorganization, the fraud claimants received one-third of the new
common stock, valued at approximately 10.5 million dollars. In the Equity Funding reorganization, the largest case of securities fraud in American history, the claimants received 24% of the
new equity, or approximately 20.9 million dollars. In both cases the fraud claimants were principally shareholders. Other reorganizations in which shareholders were permitted to share in the
debtor's assets because of their claims under the securities laws include American Loan & Fin.
Co., No. 508-72-N (E.D. Va.), noted in 39 SEC ANN. REP. 123 (1973); Farrington Mfg. Co., No.
17-71-A (E.D. Va.), noted in 39 SEC ANN. REP. 123-24 (1973); and Clute Corp., No. 32895 (D.
Colo.), noted in 36 SEC ANN. REP. 187 (1970).
42. For background on the Commission and its Report see supra note 6.
43. Commission Proposal § 4-406(a)(1). Section 4-406 also mandated the subordination of
claims by officers, directors, and affiliates of the debtor, § 4-406(a)(2), and of claims representing
fines, penalties, forfeitures, and punitive damages, § 4-406(aX3). Subsection (c) was intended to
preserve the courts' "equitable powers" to subordinate other claims and to enforce voluntary subordination agreements. § 4-406(c).
-44. Slain & Kripke, The Interace Between Securities Regulation and Bankruptcy--Alilocating
the Risk oflilegalSecuities IssuanceBetween Secuityholdersand the Issuer'sCreditors, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv.261 (1973). The authors stated that they had submitted a draft of their article to the
Commission and "of course hope that our analysis will be reflected in their proposals." Id at 299300.
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In their article, Slain and Kripke cited precedent for handling
shareholder fraud claims in three different ways. First, under the
Supreme Court's decision in Oppenheimer, the shareholder could share
equally with general creditors. 45 Second, the shareholder who
purchased his shares directly from the issuer might, at least technically,
be preferred over general creditors to the extent that he could trace the
specific consideration representing his claim. 46 Finally, the law could
estop the shareholder from asserting a claim, or at least subordinate his
claim to those of general creditors.
The final alternative obviously resembles the positions taken by
English and American courts throughout the time the subordination
issue was actively litigated, 47 and was the alternative Slain and Kripke
thought most appropriate. They argued that the problem involved an
allocation of two distinct risks: the risk of business failure and the risk
of illegal securities issuance. Both the creditor and the equityholder
fact the first of these risks, but the equityholder consents to a greater
exposure in return for his greater opportunity to participate in the busiDuring the Bankruptcy Commission's deliberations, it was apparently Harold Marsh, Jr., a
Los Angeles corporate lawyer and Chairman of the Commission, who first proposed that subordination of securities law claims be included among the Commission's recommendations:
Chairman Marsh said that in any event there was need for some new priority or subordination provisions, and he mentioned stockholders' § 10b(5) actions which in bankruptcy
may permit stockholders to come in on a parity with creditors. He cited the decision of a
case down in Kentucky or Tennessee [SEC v. InsuranceInvestors Tnst Co., discussed at
supra note 35], where the judge said he had the pistol all cocked to shoot down the
stockholders and then said to himself, "Now wait a minute." He did find that the stockholders could come in on a parity with the creditors if the claims were provable. Chairman Marsh said he didn't know whether a § 10b(5) claim is presently provable as it is a
tort claim in a sense, but it could also be a sort of contract claim or perhaps a rescission
of an original purchase. He felt that to allow classes of claimants for damages for statutory causes of actions to come in and to compete with trade creditors of an insolvent
debtor for huge amounts was wrong.
Minutes of the Bankruptcy Commission, Sept. 11-12, 1972, at 12.
The minutes of the Commission meetings reveal that Chairman Marsh was the principal
advocate of subordination. Federal district judge Edward Weinfeld initially dissented from the
proposal as it applied to the claims of small shareholders, but ultimately agreed to go along with
the other Commission members. Id, Jan. 15-16, 1973, at 26-28, Feb. 22-24, 1973, at 37-38. (The
minutes of the Bankruptcy Commission are contained among the papers of Congressman M.
Caldwell Butler, on file at the Law Library of Washington and Lee University.)
45. 301 U.S. at 215.
46. This preference might occur because, under a general theory of property transfers voidable by fraud, the transferee holds the property in constructive trust for the transferor, and this trust
defeats the rights of the transferees unsecured creditors. Slain and Kripke found support for this
alternative in In re Rhine, 241 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo. 1965), a case involving the bankruptcy of an
unincorporated oil and gas operator. Purchasers of working interests in the enterprise were permitted to reclaim the amounts of their investments from the trustee in bankruptcy. Professor
Countryman finds this alternative "a little farfetched" given the unsuccessful attempts of litigants
to establish constructive trusts in other areas. Countryman, Problem Areas in Chapter X and XI
Cases, in BANkRUpTcY AND THE CHAPTER PROCEEDINGs 271 (1976).
47. See ,upranotes 10-24 and accompanying text.
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ness's success. Slain and Kripke saw no reason to reallocate this risk,
particularly because the asset cushion provided by the equityholder at
least partially motivates the creditor to assume his share of the risk.
Similarly, Slain and Kripke found it "difficult to conceive of any reason for shifting even a small portion of the risk of [illegal securities
issuance] from the stockholder, since it is to the stockholder, and not to
the creditor, that the stock is offered. '48 Consequently, they proposed
to subordinate the defrauded shareholder to all subsequent creditors
and to any prior creditors who could prove reliance on the shareholder's investment.
Slain and Kripke's position, although different in its exact formulation, was essentially a restatement of the traditional turn-of-the-century arguments for subordination, but it apparently convinced the
Bankruptcy Commission. The Commission went even one step further
and proposed, in its section 4-406(a)(1), to extend the benefits of the
subordination to all of the issuer's general creditors, whether prior or
subsequent to any particular securities issue.49
Following the Bankruptcy Commission's report in July 1973, legislation embodying the Commission's proposals was introduced in both
houses of Congress. 50 The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
and the National Bankruptcy Conference both prepared alternatives to
48. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 288.
49. See supra note 43. The most important result of the suggestions made by Slain and
Kripke and the Bankruptcy Commission was the codification of the subordination doctrine in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. No doubt their proposals also affected the outcome of proceedings under pre-1978 law. See Kelce v. U.S. Fin. Inc., 648 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1980) (absolute
priority rule, discussed infra note 81, compelled denial of defrauded preferred shareholder's
claims for rescission and reclamation of property exchanged for his shares or for status as a general creditor), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); In re Stirling Homex Corp., 579 F.2d 206 (2d Cir.
1978) (subordination of defrauded shareholders upheld, denying them participation altogether),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); In re Weis Securities, Inc., 605 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1978)
(subordinated lenders to a securities broker-dealer estopped, upon the broker-dealer's liquidation,
from rescinding the subordination agreements on the grounds of fraud; whether the brokerdealer's customers had relied on the agreements irrelevant), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1128 (1979); In
re Cartridge Television, Inc., 535 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding a denial of shareholder
fraud claims in bankruptcy as too remote and contingent, citing Slain & Kripke with approval).
50. H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The sponsors of these bills, Representatives Edwards and Wiggins and Senators Burdick and Cook, were
all members of the Bankruptcy Commission. Their bills were reintroduced in the next Congress.
See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1975); S. 236, 94th Cong., Ist
Ses. (1975).
For concise narratives of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, see
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. 2-3 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD.
NEws 5963, 5963-65; S.REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1978),reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG.& AD.NEws 5787, 5787-88; see also Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law,
28 DEPAUL L. REv. 941 (1979).
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the bills based on the Commission's proposals, 5' but neither proposed
any changes in the Commission's provision for subordination of securities law claims. 5 2 After extensive hearings on the bankruptcy legisla-

tion during the ninety-fourth Congress, however, a subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee drafted a new bill that was eventually
introduced in the House of Representatives on January 4, 1977, as H.R.
6.53 Unlike previous alternative proposals, this bill eliminated the
mandatory subordination of securities law claims, insider claims and
54
claims based on fines, penalties, forfeitures and punitive damages.
Instead, H.R. 6 provided that a court could subordinate any allowed
claim or interest "on equitable grounds" after notice and hearing. 55
The change in the treatment of securities law claims presumably reflected the advocacy of the SEC, which, as the principal critic of the
Bankruptcy Commission's section 4-406(a)(l) in the House and Senate
56
hearings, had argued for subordination on a case-by-case basis.
57
During the markup sessions on H.R. 6 held in the spring of 1977,

51. The Bankruptcy judges' proposals were introduced as H.R. 32, 94th Cong., IstSess.
(1975); S.235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); S.4046, 93d
Cong., 2d Sesi (1974). The proposals of the National Bankruptcy Conference, a private organization of law professors, bankruptcy judges, and lawyers are set forth in Bankruptcy Act Revisioxn
Hearingson Hi. 31 and H.A 32 Before the Subcomm on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the
House Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. app. pt. 2 333 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as BANKRUPTCY AcT REVISION, 1976 House Hearings]. This appendix also reproduces and compares the language of H.R. 31, 94th Cong., IstSess. (1975) (Bankruptcy Commission's proposal)
and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (bankruptcy judges' proposal).
52. At its 1974 annual meeting the National Bankruptcy Conference considered the Commission's and the bankruptcy judges' proposals. With respect to section 4-406(a)(1) it concluded that
"as a matter of principle, the Conference favors subordination in these cases of claims of both debt
and equity socurityholders." Summary of Proceedings, National Bankruptcy Conference, 1974
Annual Meeting 3-4 (1974); see also BANKRUPTCY AcT REVISION, 1976 House Hearings,supra
note 51, at 1890 (statement of Harvey R. Miller, William J. Rochelle, Jr. and J. Ronald Trost on
behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference).
53. H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Klee, supra note 50, at 945-46. Subcommittee
Chairman' Edwards described this bill as "not a final product. It is a codification of a loose consensus of the subcommittee." 123 CONG. REC. 217 (1977).
54. Both the Bankruptcy judges' and the National Bankruptcy Conference proposals eliminated the mandatory subordination of insider claims but preserved the subordination of the other
two classes. BANKRUPTCY AcT REVISION, 1976 House Hearings,supra note 51, app. pt. I, at 142,
app. pt. 2, at 355.
55. H.R. 6 § 101, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposed 11 U.S.C. § 510(b)).
56. SEC Commissioner Loomis, accompanied by members-of the SEC staff, appeared at both
the House and the Senate hearings to present the SEC's views on the proposed legislation, including its criticism of section 4-406(a)(1). BANKRUPTCY AcT REVISION, 1976 House Hearings,supra
note 51, at 2152, The Bankruptcy Refonn Act. Hearingson S.235 andS. 236 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements i JudicnalMachineryof the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. I 707 (1975). Inaddition to the Loomis testimony, the SEC submitted a detailed report on the
proposed legislation. See supra note 3.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5963, 5964; Klee,supra note 50, at 946.
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however, mandatory subordination of securities law claims was reinstated, with the requirement that the subordination be preceded by notice and hearing. This requirement, apparently carried over from the
"equitable grounds" subordination provisions of H.R. 6 as initially
drafted, was of doubtful continued effect once the subordination was
made mandatory. With the subordination requirement in substantially
this form, the full judiciary committee reported out the bill, renumbered as H.R. 8200,58 in September 1977. 59 The committee's report
suggested that part of the reason for reinstating mandatory subordination was the concern, raised by Professor Kripke, that case-by-case subordination-at least under the traditional standards for equitable
subordination-would not be available against innocent claimants,
such as defrauded shareholders. 60
The House passed H.R. 8200 in February 1978.61 Meanwhile, the
58. The result of the subcommittee's markup was a clean bill which was introduced as H.R.
7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Section 101 set forth the revised subordination provisions of

that bill as proposed 11 U.S.C. § 510(a)(2). The subcommittee bill was revised further and a new
clean bill, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), was prepared and introduced for consideration
by the full House Judiciary Committee on July 11, 1977. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD Naws 5963, 5964; Klee, supra note 50, at
946-47.
59. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), accompanied by H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963.
60. As stated in the committee report:
Unfortunately, the SEC's desire to leave the issue to the courts on a case-by-case basis is
not as clear cut as it may seem. Professor Kripke has made clear that leaving the issue to
the courts to resolve on a case.-by-case basis in effect means that rescission claims will not
be subordinated because the doctrine of equitable subordination is inapplicable as between two innocent third parties.
H.R. RaP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Ses. 196 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5963, 6156.
The House subcommittee staff had raised the possibility of continuing to deal with securities
law claims through case-by-case subordination-as had been initially provided in H.L 6notwithstanding Professor Kripke's objections, by providing an appropriate legislative history:
"[I]f the Subcommittee intends to permit the court to subordinate on a case-by-case basis then the
legislative history accompanying § 510(b) will have to distinguish the concept of subordination on
equitable grounds from the classical concept of equitable subordination." Memorandum entitled
"Subordination of Security Rescission Claims," prepared for members of the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Seas., 6 (1977).
(This memorandum is contained among the papers of Congressman M. Caldwell Butler, ranking
minority member of the House subcommittee, on file at the Law Library of Washington and Lee
University. It reveals the impact of the Bankruptcy Commission and the Slain and Kripke article
on the subcommittee's resolution of the subordination issue. The memorandum outlines the alternative positions regarding subordination and restates the Slain and Kripke article's arguments.
Across the top of Congressman Butler's copy is a handwritten note-presumably that of the congressman himself-which states."(a) HR6 has one view-case by case, (b) Experts have anothermandatory subordination, (c) courts-a third. I go with experts.").
61. Two substantive changes in the provisions subordinating securities law claims occurred
between the time they were first reinstated in H.R. 7330 and the passage of H.RL 8200 by the
House. First, during subcommittee revision of the bill, the general equitable subordination provi-
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Senate had begun consideration of S. 2266,62 a bill based on H.R. 8200,
which included section 5 1O(a)(2), a mandatory subordination provision
identical to that in the House legislation. 63 In September 1978 the Senate passed its version of the bankruptcy legislation in the form of a
substitute amendment to H.R. 8200. In the course of resolving their
differences and adopting technical amendments, the requirement of no65
tice and hearing was dropped. 64 After some last-minute controversy,
the legislation became law on November 6, 1978. With passage of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress reinjected the subordination doctrine into American bankruptcy law with a vitality that it had not en66
joyed since the earliest American decisions, if then.
sion-proposed 11 U.S.C. §510(b)-was amended to make it clear that it applied
"[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)." H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposed IIU.S.C.
§ 510(b)). Thus, claims of participants in the fraud could be subordinated to the defrauded securityholders. Second, the full committee modified the ranking of the securities law claims by subordinating them to "all claims and interests that are senior or equal to the claim or interest
represented by such security." H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (proposed 11 U.S.C.
§ 510(a)(2)) (emphasis added). The subcommittee bill had given only senior claims and interests
the benefit of subordination.
62. S.2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
63. During hearings on S.2266, SEC Commissioner Loomis again testified and submitted a
statement by the SEC which reiterated its objection to the subordination scheme in section
510(a)(2). As before, the SEC argued to the Senate for case-by-case subordination "in accordance
with the equities of the case." Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearingson S.2266 andH
8200
Before the Subcomnn on Improvements inJudicialMachineryof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 620, 628 (1977). Nevertheless, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out
the bill with mandatory subordination unchanged. See S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), accompanied by S. REP. No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CoDE CONrG. &
AD. NEws 5787.
64. See 124 CONG. REC. 32,361 (1978) (setting forth the text of section 510(b) as included in
the compromise amendment agreed to by the House and Senate floor managers of the legislation).
Apparently the floor managers viewed this change simply as a technical and clerical amendment
and gave no explanation for it. See id at 32,398; id at 33,998 (floor statements of Rep. Edwards
and Sen. DeConcini, respectively, explaining the House-Senate compromise).
65. This principally related to the status of the bankruptcy courts. See Klee, supra note 50, at
954-57.
66. In the ninety-sixth Congress, as part of a series of technical amendments, proposals to
make changes in the language and narrow changes in the substance of section 510(b) were introduced in both houses. The amendment to section 510(b) adopted by the Senate Judiciary Committee appears in S.658 § 128, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), accompanied by S. REP. No. 305, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The amendment adopted by the House Judiciary Committee appears in S.
658 § 36, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980), accompanied by H. R. REP. No. 1195, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980).
Both versions modify the "senior or equal" provision in Section 510(b), see supra note 61, and
thereby alter the precise ranking of securities law claims within the overall hierarchy of claims.
Both versions, however, subordinate securities law claims to the claims of all senior securities.
Thus, shareholder securities law claims would, in all cases, be subordinated to contract creditors.
Both houses ultimately passed bills embodying the House version of this change, 126 CONG. REc.
S15,160, 15,163 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1980); id at HI 1,725, 11,729 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980). Agreement
on various other provisions of the technical amendments package, principally those regarding
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THE SUBORDINATION

DOCTRINE

The judicial development of the subordination doctrine, the recent
commentary of Slain and Kripke, and the legislative history of section
510(b) suggest four distinct arguments for subordinating the defrauded
shareholder. First, corporate creditors rely on the equity cushion provided by the shareholder's capital; therefore, the law should not allow
the shareholder to invoke remedies that would contravene creditors'
legitimate expectations. Second, the shareholder accepts a position
junior to general creditors, in part, as a quid pro quo for his right to
sole participation in the corporate estate after the creditors' fixed claims
have been satisfied. Allowing him to participate if the corporation succeeds but to renounce shareholder status and claim as a general creditor if the corporation fails gives him the best of both worlds and is
unfair to the other creditors. Third, shareholder fraud remedies against
the issuer have developed with the implicit expectation that the economic burden of the remedy will fall on the issuer, who was involved in
the wrongdoing and may have benefited by it. If the issuer's insolvency
shifts the burden to the pockets of innocent creditors, many of the policies underlying the remedies would not apply. Fourth, traditional principles of estoppel and laches should bar the shareholder from asserting
a remedy. 67 After briefly reviewing some general principles of bankruptcy law that support treating the defrauded shareholder as a general
creditor, this part considers the first three subordination rationales in
depth.

68

A. Some GeneralPrinciplesin Support of Parity.
Hornbook bankruptcy law dictates that, with limited exceptions,6 9
retirement of bankruptcy judges, was not reached, so none of the technical amendments, including

the subordination change, became law.
Bankruptcy amendments legislation was introduced in both houses of the ninety-seventh
Congress. The Senate passed a comprehensive set of amendments, including an amendment to
section 510(b) similar to that passed by the prior Congress, see S. 863 § 36, accompanied by S.
Rn,. No. 150,97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981) (passed July 17, 1981); 127 CoNo. REC. S7907 (daily ed.

July 17, 1981). The leadership of the subcommittee with responsibility for bankruptcy legislation
in the House, however, did not include any substantive changes to section 510(b) in the technical
amendments bill introduced in 1981. See H.R. 3705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
67. This overlaps to some extent with the first and second rationales.

68. The concepts of estoppel and laches will be discussed in connection with the first and
second rationales.

69. The principal exceptions are: (1) the statutory priority system set forth in Bankruptcy
Code § 507, 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. V 1981); (2) the equitable subordination doctrine discussed in

the ensuing text; and (3) the subordination of claims representing fines, penalties, and punitive
damages pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 726(aX4), 11 U.S.C. § 726(aX4) (Supp. V 1981).
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claims of all general creditors stand on the same footing.70 In general,

the law does not discriminate on the basis of the nature of the claim,
the nature of the claimant, or the nature of the claimant's relationship

to the debtor. Instead, substantive law outside the bankruptcy process
defines the elements necessary to give one person a claim against another and the bankruptcy system defers to that substantive law by treating all claims equally. A widow who loaned her last $5,000 to the
debtor shares inpar'passuwith the claim of a wealthy actress whom

the debtor owes $750,000 for dohig nothing because it elected not to
produce the motion picture in which it had signed her to star.7' Further, a $10,000 contract claim against the debtor, whether for money

loaned, goods delivered, or service performed, generally stands on a
par with a $10,000 tort claim against the debtor resulting, for example,
from the wrongful conduct of its employees. 72 The equitable subordination doctrine provides the only general opportunity for a court to
look behind a claim and discriminate against it on the basis of its underlying facts. A review of the cases applying this doctrine indicates its

limited scope:73 the claims involved are usually asserted by a controlling shareholder or other insider of the debtor, and courts invoking the

doctrine usually 74 premise it on some element of fraud, wrongdoing, or
mismanagement by those claimants--often unrelated to the claims
themselves." Thus the doctrine does not provide blanket authorization

for courts to discriminate against otherwise valid claims on the basis of
70.

. McLACHLAN,

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY

§ 256 (1956).

71. The facts for the latter example are derived from Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film

Corp, 3 Cal. 3d 176, 474 P.2d 689, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1970).
72. Under the Bankruptcy Act, some classes of tort claims were not provable in bankruptcy
until reduced to judgment. This had no bearing on the parity of tort and contract claims, however,a provable tort claim stood on a par with a provable contract claim. The Bankruptcy Code
essentially eliminates the concept of provability. See IIU.S.C. § 10 1(4) (Supp. V 1981).
73. See Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND.
L. REv. 83 (1961).
74. The exceptions involve "inadequate capitalization" cases, in which the controlling shareholders of a corporation structure most of their investment in the form of loans to the corporation
rather than.purchasing equity with the result that the corporation has an unusually high debt-toequity ratio. In bankruptcy, outside creditors object to the insiders' claims on the grounds that
they actually represent a proprietary interest in the business and should be junior to other creditors. These situations should more properly be viewed as problems of disallowance rather than
subordination. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 73, at 93-94. The cases do not clearly reveal
whether inadequate capitalization by itself warrants subordination. See Clark, The Duties of the
CorporateDebtorto Its Creditors, 90 HA.v. L. R, .505, 534-36 (1977).
75. One recent article characterizes the equitable subordination doctrine as a functional substitute for conventional fraudulent conveyance law. Equitable subordination enjoys an advantage: it provides the trustee in bankruptcy with certain administrative and procedural
conveniences and an expanded application not available under the latter doctrine. Clark, supra
note 74, at 517-36.
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an equitable assessment of their worthiness; indeed, the cases applying
the doctrine supply no support for subordinating the claim of a passive
76
investor that arises solely from the wrongdoing of another.
Even if bankruptcy law permitted discrimination between all
classes of claims based on general notions of their equitable worthiness,
it is far from clear that shareholder fraud claims should be or would be
among those classes disfavored. An investor who pays an issuer $50 for
a share of stock worth only $20 because the issuer's management has
misrepresented its financial condition in order to drive up the stock
price suffers a direct and immediate loss of value. In economic terms
this value loss is no different from that incurred if $30 were taken from
him by force. Moreover, unlike many tort claims the investor's $30 loss
creates a matching $30 gain to the debtor. This increases the amount of
the debtor's estate available to creditors by $30. Not only is the inves- .
tor economically injured but the debtor is unjustly enriched.
Even the principal proponents of subordination concede that, if
anything, the general policy of the law is to favor the victim of fraud or
mistake over the general contract creditor, 77 presumably because the
former had no valid opportunity to consent to the true risks involved in
dealing with debtor.78 Consequently, in seeking to compel subordination of securities law claims, the proponents of section 510(b) must conclude that circumstances peculiar to the shareholder-creditor
relationship warrant a deviation from these general principles. The following sections consider the validity of this conclusion.
76. One of the reasons given for making specific provision for shareholder fraud claims

under section 510(b) was that traditional principles of equitable subordination were not applicable
"as between two innocent third parties." See supra note 60. These traditional principles of equitable subordination have been codified in section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Senate

report on this provision stated: "Any subordination ordered under this provision must be based
on principles of equitable subordination. These principles are defined by case law, and have generally indicated that a claim may normally be subordinated only if its holder is guilty of misconduct." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD.
NEws 5787, 5860.
77. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 284-85. The equitable mechanism for preferring the
fraud or mistake victim is to impose a constructive trust on the property transferred by the victim
to the debtor. See REsTATEmENr OF RESTITUTION §§ 166, 160 commentf, 173 comment] (1937).
The constructive trust will survive in bankruptcy to permit the fraud or hmistake victim to reclaim
the property from the bankruptcy estate. 4 L.KING, COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1541.13 (15th ed.
1982); U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. v. Lester (In re Fieldcrest Homes, Inc.), 18 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. N.D.
Il.1982); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Angus (In re Angus), 9 Bankr. 769 (Bankr. Ore. 1981).

78. Of course, the same facts that cause the shareholder's loss may cause many general contract creditors to be defrauded as well. Thus, in most cases no favoritism of one group over the
other would be warranted. Cf i.ra text accompanying note 187 (discussing how subordination
doctrine favors defrauded creditors over defrauded shareholders).
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B. Reliance by Corporate Creditors.
As Part I of this article demonstrates, the rationale invoked most
consistently and forcefully to support subordination has been that subordination is necessary to protect the creditor's legitimate expectation
that his claim will be senior to the "investment" or "contract" claims of
shareholders.7 9 American courts, relying on this rationale, have distinguished between relying and nonrelying creditors, extending the benefits of subordination only to the former. 80 Professors Slain and Kripke
also advocated this distinction, and the reliance rationale appears to
form the core of their position as well.8 '
1. 7he TWo Dimensions of CreditorReliance: Priorityand Cushioning. In its purest terms, a corporate creditor's reliance on the subordination of equityholders involves two aspects: '"priority" and
"cushioning." Priority means simply that debt is senior to equity. If
the corporation is liquidated, in bankruptcy or otherwise, debts-must be
paid in full before any remaining assets are distributed to equityholders; if the corporation is reorganized, the "absolute priority" rule
developed under Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act assures the
creditor a comparable protection of his expectation of seniority. 82
This structuring of the creditor-shareholder relationship leads to a
second aspect of reliance referred to as the cushion factor. The cushion
may be viewed as the portion of the balance-sheet assets attributable to
the shareholders' paid-in capital or to earnings reinvested in the business that, at least in theory, enable the business to absorb losses over
83
time without compromising its capacity to pay creditor claims in full.
79. Throughout this article the terms "contract claims" and "investment claims" of shareholders refer to shareholders residual claims to the assets of the corporation under traditional
corporate law, as opposed to any securities law claims they may have.
80., See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
82. The absolute priority rule required that each senior class of claimants against the debtor
receive cash or securities equal to the full value of its claims before any junior class could participate. Thus, if the reorganized debtor had a going concern value of $10 million and creditor claims
totalled $12 million, creditors would be entitled to receive the full interest in the debtor. Any
creditor could attack a plan that provided equityholders any participation, no matter how small.
The rule developed as an interpretation of the "fair and equitable" requirement for judicial approval and confirmation of the reorganization plan. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois,
312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Bankruptcy Act
§§ 174, 221(2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2) (1976). The new Bankruptcy Code has adopted a hybrid

form of the absolute priority rule for application'to reorganizations under Chapter 11. See II
U.S.C. § 1129(b) (Supp. V 1981).

83. The statement in the text, phrased in terms of balance-sheet assets, describes the tradi.tional characterization of the equity cushion. Modern financial theory holds, however, that the

value of an ongoing business enterprise is determined not by its balance sheet assets but by the
discounted present value of its future cash flows. This change in orientation does not alter the
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The cushion also serves to assure creditors that the shareholders, who
elect management, have a substantial risk exposure in the business and
will not gamble with the creditors' money.

The existence and size of the corporation's equity cushion no
doubt often plays a major role in a prospective lender's decision to
grant credit.8 4 Corporate law protects the creditor's reliance on this
cushion by limiting the amount of assets the corporation may distribute
to its shareholders and by permitting creditors to impose additional distribution limitations by contract. Not surprisingly, some of the commentators on the bankruptcy subordination doctrine, including Slain
and Kripke, phrase their reliance rationale largely in terms of the right

of creditors to rely on the equity cushion.8 5 In bankruptcy, however,
the cushion aspect of the debt-equity relation means less than it does in
the setting of a loan decision. The fact of the corporation's bankruptcy
often suggests that the cushion, whatever its past importance, has been
exhausted and is no longer of much value to creditors.8 6 Instead, as a
corporation approaches insolvency, creditors become concerned with
the amounts and kinds of competing claims for the debtor's assets-in

other words, the priority aspect of reliance.
Furthermore, if proponents of subordinating securities law claims
really wish to protect the cushion, the subordination doctrine, triggered
only in bankruptcy, is a poor solution. Prior to bankruptcy, securities
law claims erode the cushion, as does any other form of business loss.
cushioning aspect of equity. The equity cushion becomes the excess of the present value of the
terms future cash flows over the present value of the interest and principal payments due
creditors.
84. The extent to which a prospective creditor will inquire into the corporation's financial
condition (both present and prospective) as a basis for deciding to extend credit varies with the
amount of the credit, the duration of the credit, and the nature of the creditor. Corporate creditors
fall into three groups: (1) trade creditors who supply the corporation with goods or services; (2)
banks, insurance companies, and other institutional lenders; and (3) public investors who
purchase the corporation's debt securities. Because of the costs involved, trade creditors may not
find it worthwhile to make an individual credit assessment, although they might rely on information provided by companies like Dun & Bradstreet. The trade creditor may, therefore, rely more
on past experience with the corporation and its general reputation for paying its debts than on its
balance-sheet financial condition. See infra note 110 (authorities cited). Institutional lenders, on
the other hand, will typically make a detailed review of the corporate financial condition as a part
of the loan negotiation process. Public investors in effect delegate this review process to others,
specifically the investment bankers that underwrite the debt securities and the rating agencies
(Moody's and Standard & Poor's) that assign a rating to them.
85. See, ag., Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206, 214 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 286-89.
86. This will not necessarily be the case in all bankruptcies. In some, the corporation may
have a positive equity cushion as measured by its net worth, and nonetheless be motivated to
declare bankruptcy because of liquidity-based difficulties in meeting its debts as they become due.
The potential existence of these exceptions does not, however, alter the analysis that follows.
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The subordination doctrine only assures a bank making a corporate

loan that if the company becomes bankrupt, the bank can recover the
full amount of its loan before the shareholders may participate in the

corporate asset pool on the basis of their securities law claims or otherwise. But this is all the doctrine assures. If the shareholders discover

their claims and reduce them to judgment prior to bankruptcy, they are
entitled to full payment from the assets of the company. The bank can
then invoke the subordination doctrine only if it can force the corporation into an involuntary bankruptcy.8 7 If the corporation is otherwise
healthy financially the bank may be extremely reluctant to take this

step. 8 Thus, because assets representing securities law claims may be
withdrawn from the corporation, thereby reducing its equity cushion,
at any time short of bankruptcy, the subordination doctrine is not a
logical adjunct to the creditor's legally protected reliance interest with

respect to the cushion aspect of the debt-equity relation. 89

87. Under the Bankruptcy Code, any three creditors with total claims of $5,000 or more may
commence an involuntary case. Bankruptcy Code § 303(b), 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) (Supp. V 1981).
The court must order involuntary relief unless the debtor controverts the petition; if the debtor
does so, the court will dismiss the petition unless it finds, after a trial, that:
(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become due; or
(2) within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian, other than a
trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing a lien against such
property, was appointed or took possession.
Id § 303(h). Thus, in order to force a corporation into bankruptcy, a creditor must persuade two
other creditors to join it in a bankruptcy petition and must be prepared to prove that the corporation is not meeting its debts as they become due.
88. One commentator, discussing the disadvantages of contractual subordination arrangements triggered only by bankruptcy has noted that "[firom the practical point of view, probably,
one of the least successful ways for a creditor to collect money from a debtor is to put the debtor
into bankruptcy." Calligar, SubordnatilonAgreements, 70 YALE LJ. 376, 380 (1961).
89. There is a similar weakness in the estoppel argument for preventing shareholders from
asserting securities law claims. This argument has been made and sometimes accepted in a few
cases involving claims based on failure to comply with state blue sky laws. See Slain & Kripke,
supra note 44, at 281-82 (quoting from In re Racine Auto Tire Co., 290 F. 939 (7th Cir. 1923));see
also cases discussed at 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1679-81 (2d ed. 1961). But conventional estoppel requires some representation or concealment by the party to be estopped on which
the party asserting the estoppel relies to his detriment. See generally 3 J. POMEROy, TREATISE ON

EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 805 (5th ed. 1941). Thus an estoppel of shareholders! securities law
remedies would logically depend on -some representation by the shareholders that they would
forego such remedies in favor of the corporate creditors. In the example in the text, until the
shareholders detect the violations giving rise to their claims, no basis exists for inferring such a
representation or for creditor reliance on it. The creditors continue to risk that the shareholders
will learn of their claims and recover a judgment from the corporation. Only after the shareholders acquire knowledge or notice of the existence of grounds for recovery and fail to act can such a
representation be claimed. See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 333 F.2d 568, 570 (9th Cir.
1964); Regan v. Albin, 219 Cal. 357, 359-60, 26 P.2d 475, 476 (1933); R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF

§ 90, at 411 (2d ed. 1949) (specifically discussing the question of rescission after insolvencyY, Note, Applicability of Waiver, Estoppel,andLaches Defenses to
Private Suit Under the Securities Act and S.E.C Rule ob-5. Deterrrenceand Equity in Balance, 73
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

DUKE L4WJOURN4L

[Vol. 1983:1

The subordination doctrine's relation to the priority aspect of the
debt-equity relationship permits, however, a stronger argument that
subordination is consistent with creditor expectations. Assuming that a
bank does place significant weight on a corporation's financial condition in deciding to make a loan, the bank will assess not only the corporation's immediate financial position but also the potential changes in
that position over the course of the loan. For example, the bank will
evaluate prospective cash flow and the competing claims that may arise
against it. If the corporation goes bankrupt, the bank may properly
assert a priority over the contract claims of the corporation's shareholders; therefore, the bank would not treat these as competing claims when
making its initial credit assessment.
What about any securities law, claims by these shareholders? The
bank probably could not project the creation and assertion of this
whole new class of competing claims. If this represents the more accurate and realistic view of why parity for securities law claims interferes
with creditors' "reliance" interests, the problem really involves a larger
question of the business risk resulting from any corporate borrower's
exposure to large-scale class action judgments. Is there any reason for
immunizing a creditor from this risk when it arises from a securities
law claim, if the creditor must accept the risk that a comparable claim
may arise from an antitrust or products safety class action?
Suppose that Futurific Enterprises has recently raised $30 million
through a public offering of its stock underwritten by Buckett, Shoppe
& Co., an investment banking firm. The prospectus for the offering
contained a materially misleading statement and when the truth is discovered the price of Futurific stock falls from $30 to $5. Both Futurific
and Buckett, Shoppe then file for bankruptcy. Members of Futurific's
management and several Buckett, Shoppe principals knew that the
statement was false at the time of the offering. One group of investors
who purchased shares in the offering brings a class action for $12.5
million against Futurific under section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933;90 another group brings a $12.5 million class action against Buckett, Shoppe under the same section. Under the Bankruptcy Code, the
court must subordinate the section 11 claims asserted against Futurific
YALE

LJ. 1477, 1486-87 (1964) (by implication). Consequently, actions by the shareholders prior

to this point, such as voting their shares, receiving dividends, or even participating in management, are meaningless for purposes of estoppel theory because they communicate nothing about
the shareholders' likely reaction when they discover the violations. Also, only those who become
creditors after this discovery-with actual or presumed knowledge of the shareholders' inaction
after discovering the violation---can legitimately claim the reliance necessary to assert an estoppel.
90. 15 U.S.C. §77k (1976).
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to the claims of Futurific's general creditors, 9' but it will not
subordinate the same claims against Buckett, Shoppe unless Buckett,
Shoppe is an "affiliate" of Futurific. 92 If Buckett, Shoppe is not an
affiliate, the investor claimants will share equally with Buckett,
Shoppe's general creditors. 93 But is there any aprioribasis for saying
that the probable expectations of Futurific's creditors concerning the
risk of these claims is any different from those of Buckett, Shoppe's
creditors?
Proponents of the reliance rationale have failed to give a truly satisfactory answer to this apparently unreasonable discrimination between securities law claims against bankrupt issuers and securities law
claims against bankrupt nonissuers. They also fail to explain the distinction between securities claims and antitrust or products liability
cases. To explain both distinctions, they essentially argue (1) that
debtholders have a priority over the contract claims of equityholders,
(2) that debtholders presumably rely on this priority in deciding to extend credit and in pricing that credit, and (3) that because participation
by equityholders' securities law claims would produce similar economic consequences to participation by equityholders' contract
claims, 94 debtholders must have priority over the securities law claims
91. Bankruptcy Code § 510(b), 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (Supp. V 1981).
92. By its terms, section 510(b) subordinates securities law claims based upon the purchase or
sale of a security "of the debtor or of an affiliate." The term "affiliate" is defined to include any:
(A)entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 per-

cent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that
holds such securities-

(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such
securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(B) corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity
that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more
of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that holds such
securities(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to vote such
securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote;
(C) person whose business is operated under a lease or operating agreement by a debtor,
or person substantially all of whose property is operated under an operating agreement
with the debtor, or (D) entity that operates the business or all or substantially all of the
property of the debtor under a lease or operating agreement...
Bankruptcy Code § 101(2), 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (Supp. V 1981).
93. If a substantial portion of Buckett, Shoppe's business involves operating as a brokerdealer at the retail level, the claims of perhaps its largest class of general creditors-its brokerage
customers--will, under either the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 or the Bankruptcy
Code, have a priority over the section 11 claims. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
§ 6(cX2), 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(c)(2) (1976); Bankruptcy Code §§ 751, 752, 11 U.S.C. §§ 751, 752
(Supp. V 1981). This result has no bearing on the analysis in the text, however.
94. The consequences of participation by equityholder securities law claims and by equityholder contract claims are similar but not identical. First, some equityholders will have no basis
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as well. 9 5

This reasoning involves significant bootstrapping. Few would seriously dispute that the claims of corporations' creditors should have
priority over the contract claims of their shareholders. Even though the
resulting reliance by creditors on this priority forms an important basis
for enforcing it, the principal basis for enforcement is the implicit contract itself.96 A deal is, after all, a deal.
More to the point, the terms of any underlying deal between creditors and shareholders are, in the absence of express contractual provisions, whatever terms the law chooses to write. If Congress had
provided in the Bankruptcy Code that securities law claims would participate on a par with general creditors, creditors-at least those who
extended credit after the adoption of the Code--could not argue that
parity violated their reliance interests. The real issue underlying the
reliance rationale is, therefore, whether it is advisable from the standpoint of sound corporate law policy to provide creditors a limited immunity9 7 from the risk of securities law claims.

2. Possible Justfcations Underlying the Reliance Rationale: Implicit Agreements and Costs of Capital. Two alternative views of the

reliance rationale could provide the necessary justification for protecting creditors from this risk. The first is that subordination represents
the existing implicit agreement between creditors and shareholders for
for recovery under the securities laws-they may have purchased their shares before the fraudulent activity commenced or after its disclosure. Second, some securities law claimants may no
longer be equityholders, but former equityholders who have sold their shares. Third, the amount
of the'equityholders' participation under contract or securities law claims will differ both in individual cases and in the aggregate because the amount recoverable under the latter claims usually
differs from the offering or trading price of the shares.
95. Some recent authorities frame this argument in terms of the absolute priority rule described supra at note 82. That rule, so their argument runs, reflects the claimants' underlying
expectations, which would be violated if securities law claims are given parity. Thus, they conclude, the absolute priority rule compels subordination. Kelce v. U.S. Fin., Inc., 648 F.2d 515, 51921 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 970 (1981); see also Huff, The DefraudedInvestor in
ChapterXReorganizations: Absolute Priorityv. Rule lOb-., 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1976); Slain
& Kripke, supra note 44, at 262-63, 286-87 (first suggestion of this argument). This adds nothing
to the argument in the text. The absolute priority rule concerns step (1), the debtholders' priority
over the contract claims of shareholders. It adds no fresh support for the key point of the argument, step (3), regarding why this priority should also apply to securitieslaw claims.
96. For example, courts have enforced contractual subordination arrangements even when
proof of reliance by the senior classes is lacking. See In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 40710 (2d Cir. 1966); see also Everett, SubordinatedDebt-Natureand Enforcement, 20 Bus. LAW.
953, 964-67 (1965) (discussingIn re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938), and
In re Associated Gas & Elem. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aj'dsub nom. Elias v. Clarke,
143 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944)).
97. This immunity is "limited" because it exists only if the corporation enters bankruptcy.
See supra text accompanying notes 87-89 & infra note 119.
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allocating the risk of securities law violations. If this is the case, Con-

gress has no reason to upset this agreement by adopting a contrary rule
of parity-particularly because many parties might act without specific
knowledge of the statutory rule. There is little evidence, however, to
suggest that creditors' and shareholders' expectations are well formed
on this point, much less that their expectations coincide. A survey of
creditors and shareholders concerning the rule in the context of a specific fact situation, such as the Futurific hypothetical, might well find
that few knew of any rule and that among those who had views on this
point, creditors favored a rule of subordination and shareholders favored a rule of parity.
The second formulation of reliance policy is more result-oriented:
a rule of parity, by shifting a portion of the cost of securities law violations to creditors, would deter or increase the cost of beneficial lending
and serve as a disincentive to corporate creditors generally. This formulation acknowledges that no clear implicit agreement between creditors and shareholders concerning the participation of securities law
claims exists, and asks instead what effect each rule--subordination
and priority-would have on the credit and investment decisions made
by each party.
This formulation requires some puzzling assumptions about the
inadequacy of financial market forces. If prospective lenders regarded
a rule of parity as materially reducing the expected payoff of a contemplated loan, their easy response would be to demand compensation for
this greater risk in the form of a higher interest rate. Admittedly, this
would increase the cost of debt financing, but at the same time by providing shareholders with a greater recovery in the event of securities
law violations it would presumably reduce the cost of equity financing.
Thus it is not clear that subordination of securities law claims would
affect a corporation's total costs of capital: increases or reductions in
the cost of equity financing might offset reductions or increases in debt
costs.98
98. Clearly, the question of a distinction between subordination and parity rules as they affect the relative costs of debt and equity finahcing is a complex one, involving, among other considerations, the elasticity of the supply of business credit. Cf Meckling, FinancialMarket,
Default,andBankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13,
19-24; Weston, Some Economic Fundamentalsforan Analysis of Bankruptcy, id at 47, 48-51 (discussing the general question of who bears the increased costs of lending resulting from changes in
the bankruptcy law). A definitive answer to this question awaits an empirical study. The important point for present purposes, though, is that no apriori reason exists for believing that any
increased risk to lenders-posed by the parity rule and passed on to corporate borrowers in the
form of higher interest rates-would not be offset by a willingness on the part of the shareholders
to accept the resulting decreased return as fair compensation for the greater protection they receive against security fraud losses.
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Furthermore, the assumption that the distinction between the parity and subordination rules would have a material impact on prospec-

tive creditors is itself doubtful. The issue is not the impact of the rule
on creditors at the time of bankruptcy, but its impact on creditor expectations at the time their lending decisions are made.
The impact of a subordination rule is different today from what it
would have been during the last three decades of the nineteenth cen-

tury, when American courts largely developed the reliance rationale for
favoring contract creditors over defrauded shareholders. In the late

nineteenth century, equity commitments largely took the form of subscriptions, 99 shareholders were few and often insiders,1e° and nominal

capital was regarded as representing the principal, perhaps sole, basis
for a corporation's credit.' 0 ' The courts of this period operated without
benefit of modem financial or accounting theory.' 0 2 Understandably
99. As stated by one commentator:.

It is a common saying and a well-recognized fact that the subscribers to certain corporate
enterprises, especially railroads, rarely realize a profit from their investment, but, on the
contrary, lose the whole amount of the subscription which they have made. These sub.
scriptions are generally not called in until after corporate insolvency has occurred. Then
the reluctance of the subscriber to pay a subscription from which there is no hope of a
return leads him to search out and build up all possible defenses to defeat any action for
the collection of the amount due from him.
I W. COOK, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK § 166, at 314
(4th ed. 1898).
100. Throughout most of this period, businesses, with the exceptions of the railroads, cotton
textile mills, and some large financial institutions and mining enterprises, were still closely held
and their securities were just beginning to receive the ittention of the investment banking community. See V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 29-50 (1970); Navin & Sears, The Rlse
of a.Marketfor IndustrialSecurities,29 Bus. HIST. REv. 105, 105-16 (1955); R. FOULKE, PRACTICAL FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 25 (6th ed. 1968).
101. Justice Mitchell's.opinion in the Hospes case provides the classic statement of this view:
The capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit. It is a substitute for the individual
liability ofthose who own its stock. People deal with it and give it credit on the faith of it.
They have a right to assume that it has paid-in capital to the amount which it represents
itself as having ....
...
Inasmuch as the capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit, its financial
standing and reputation in the community has its source in, and is founded upon, the
amount of its professed and supposed capital, and everyone who deals with it does so
upon the faith of that standing and reputation, although, as a matter of fact, he may have
no personal knowledge of the amount of its professed capital ....
Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 197-98, 50 N.W. 1117, 1121 (1892). For
examples of similar language from other court opinions of the period see D. DODD, STOCK WATERING 14-17 (1930);seealso 1 W. COOK, supra note 99, § 199, at 358, which after advancing this
position, concludes: "The public has a right to assume that the capital stock has been or will be
fly paid up, if it be necessary in order to meet corporate liabilities. Accordingly, the American
courts go very far to protect corporate creditors .... "
102. See the comments of Bayless Manning on the lack of a cohesive theory of corporate
finance by the courts of this period. B. MANNING, upra note 18, at 16, 17-39parim.
On the early development of the accounting profession in this country see R. FOULKE, supra
note 100, at 21-23; Hawkins, The Development of Modem FinancialReporting Practice Among
American Manufacturing Corporations,37 Bus. HIsT. REV. 135, 153-55 (1963).
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they sought to ensure that nominal capital in the form of subscription
liabilities provided a true source of assets for the creditor-outsiders if
the venture failed.' 0 3 Thus, nineteenth century courts viewed fraud as
simply another defense a subscriber could not use to avoid liability for
his portion of the full value of the equity fund.
Consider, for example, the situation behind the first federal court
cases to consider the fate of the defrauded shareholder of an insolvent
corporation.10 4 In the 1870s, an agent for a newly reorganized fire and
casualty insurance company, Great Western, called on prospective investors and offered them the opportunity to purchase shares of the
company's $100 par value common stock for a down payment of $20
per share., The agent said that, although the investor was technically
liable for the balance, no further assessment would be made. One year
later Great Western, having made the unfortunate business decision to
write fire insurance in Chicago in the early 1870s, incurred claims well
in excess of its assets and passed into receivership. When the receiver
sought to collect the balance due on investors' shares, the investors
raised the agent's "fraudulent" assurance of no liability as a defense.
It is easy to understand why the late nineteenth century courts favored the receiver. The shareholders' collective obligation to pay the
remaining 80% of the par value of their shares represented, in effect, the
insurance company's reserve against the contingency that losses might
103. Providing this assurance was probably a high priority for a legal system still coming to
grips with the notion of limited liability. The courts' methods of obtaining this assurance were the
trust-fund metaphor, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, and the "holding out" concept
of the Hosper case. See Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117
(1892); see a/so supra text accompanying note 19. Hospes did not involve a defrauded shareholder
but the liability of recipients of so-called "bonus" stock, that is, common stock given gratuitously
to investors but nonetheless reflected in the corporation's capitalization at an amount equal to its
par value. The court concluded that because the corporation had held itself out to creditors as
having paid-in capital that included the bonus stock, the recipients of that stock should be liable to
creditors for the amount of its par value.
104. Most of the cases arose from the failure of the Great Western Insurance Co. See Chubb
v. Upton, 95 U.S. 665 (1877); Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875); Upton v. Englehart, 28 F.
Cas. 835 (C.C.D. Iowa 1874) (No. 16,800); Upton v. Hansbrough, 28 F. Cas. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1873)
(No. 16,801). Upton was the assignee for the benefit of Great Western's creditors. The company
was originally organized in Illinois in 1857 with a capital of $100,000, but its capital stock was
increased to $5 million in connection with a reorganization in 1870. Of this, $1,188,900 was subscribed and $223,000 paid in. The company's finances were ruined by the great Chicago fire of
October 8-9, 1871. Subscribers sought to escape liability on various grounds in addition to that of
the agent's fraud. See also Webster v. Upton, 91 U.S. 65 (1876); Sanger v. Upton, 91 U.S. 56
(1875); Upton v. Jackson, 28 F. Cas. 844 (C.C.W.D. Mich. 1874) (No. 16,802) (involving defenses
other than fraud). The courts upheld liability in every reported decision. See also Sawyer v.
Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873); Payson v. Withers, 19 F. Cas. 29 (C.C.D. Ind. 1873) (No.
10,864) (decisions on similar facts).
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exceed premium payments. 10 5 The prospective policyholder's willingness to deal with the corporation probably depended largely on the
existence and integrity of the reserve, and courts therefore attached a
high priority to immunizing this reserve from shareholder defenses.t°6

The position of the prospective creditor in a contemporary business financing decision is different, however, from that of the Great
Western policyholder. The sophistication in both financial practice
and financial law that has evolved since the subordination doctrine
originated has considerably undercut the policy arguments for assuring
the business creditor protection from the prospect of securities law
claims by shareholders. First, the characteristics of the parties have

changed; the typical class of shareholders has shifted from a small
group of entrepreneurs and local investors to a dispersed public body.
Most contemporary shareholders lack any means to familiarize themselves with the financial affairs of the issuer other than through its pub105. See the discussion of this early form of insurance company financing in Oglivie v. Knox
Ins. Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 380, 387-88 (1860).
106. Undoubtedly the courts also found the equities of the subscriber in this kind of case far
from compelling. Although the agent's assurances might be characterized by the subscriber as a
fraud, the facts shade easily into the general body of law concerning side agreements between
agent and subscriber, and the closely related notions of bonus and discount shares, that the courts
refused to protect. See Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610, 620-21 (1873); 1 W. COOK, supra
note 99, §§ 135-38; 1 V. MORAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 83,
87 (2d ed. 1886); 2 id § 842.
Most of these cases arose out of the initial capitalizations of smaller companies and involved
subscriptions solicited through face-to-face transactions by corporate agents and promoters. The
services of the investment banking industry were reserved for the bonds and preferred shares of
the railroads and the larger industrial combinations. See V. CARosso, supra note 100, at 29-50.
The courts may have feared that allowing the subscriber's own recollection and testimony concerning the agent's oral representations of the subscriber's liability, the amount of other capital
committed, and the likely success of the venture to provide the basis for rescission would seriously
jeopardize the integrity of stock subscriptions generally. Cf the Cook quotation upra at note 99.
In addition, the courts may have been influenced by continuing notions of caveat emptor with
respect to anyone who would purchase something as speculative as common stock. See Hawkins,
supra note 102, at 141; cf A. BERLE, CASES AND. MATERIALS INTHE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE 236 (1930) ("Conservative people bought bonds. The common stockholder was regarded as
a gambler who was content to take a chance.").
Some courts also disfavored shareholders by stiffening the elements for recovery such as reliance and a misrepresentation of fact. See I W. COOK, supra note 99, §§ 135-65; 1 V. MORAWETZ,
supra note 106 §§ 94-108. For example, as an illustration of the principle that statements constituting opinions or promises (as opposed to representations of fact) will not provide a basis for
rescission, Morawetz in his treatise notes that:
a statement made by an agent obtaining subscriptions for shares in a railroad company,
to the effect that the proposed road would be built upon a certain route or within a
certain period of time, would not render a subscription made upon the faith of it voidable, though the statement be made with the intention to deceive, and the road be not
built upon the route or within the time indicated.
1 V. MoRAw Tz supra, § 98, at 97 (footnote omitted). Morawetz cites 10 cases in support of this
proposition.
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lished reports and the financial press. The class of creditors, on the
other hand, although it includes many comparatively small claimants
in the form of trade creditors and individual holders of the debtor's
bonds and debentures, is likely to be dominated by large financial institutions. As a result, the comparative abilities of the debt and equity
classes to protect themselves from fraud and to represent their interests
vigorously in a bankruptcy proceeding may have flipflopped since the
late nineteenth century.107
Second, the factual premise of the nineteenth century position,
that a corporation's share capital was the basis for its credit,108 no
longer fully describes how business creditors behave. The modem
business creditor has much broader sources of insight into the corporation's financial condition o9 and a more refined appreciation for the
particular financial characteristics that reflect an ability to repay debt.
Short-term creditors are far more concerned with the security underlying the loan and the corporation's short-run liquidity than its long-run
capital structure. Trade creditors in particular typically place more
emphasis on past experience with the debtor and its reputation in the
commercial community than on an analysis of its financial condition.1 0 Long-term lenders continue to look at a corporation's equity
cushion, as measured by indicators such as the debt-equity ratio, as an
important source of protection; but it has become only one of several
factors in the lending decision. These lenders are necessarily futureoriented: they want to know whether the business corporation's prospects will allow it to generate ample cash flow to cover its debt service.
As Bayless Manning has noted, the experience of the 1930s demonstrated to creditors that "enterprise debt is not ultimately paid out of
107. Congress has recognized the shifting characteristics of the shareholder and creditor
classes and the resulting diminished need for the absolute priority rule. See H. R. REP.No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st ess. 222 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6181,
108. See supra note 101.
109. For a description of the primitive state of financial reporting practices in the last half of
the nineteenth century and the reluctance of businessmen, stemming from an era of closely-held
enterprise, to make financial information available to outsiders see R. FOULKE, supra note 100, at
12-23; Hawkins, supra note 102, at 135-45.
110. See B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 91-95. For a good discussion of trade credit practices
see Note, FqiatableSubordination of Shareholder Debt to Trade Creditors: A Reexamination, 61
B.U.L. Rav. 433, 442-43 (1981) and authorities cited therein. But e.Jean, How Business Credit
GrantorsRate Teir Banks, J. CoM. BANK LENDING, Mar. 1982, at 40, 42 (indicating that most
trade creditors obtain and employ financial statement information but also stating, "Although
both banks and the trade spread and thoroughly analyze entire financial statements to assess
creditworthiness, their analysis of repayment ability is sometimes focused on different areas. For
example, the trade is always repaid out of working capital while banks often analyze cash flow
over extended periods to determine a company's ability to repay long-term financing.").
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balance sheet assets but rather out of operating profits."' II
Third, shareholders' equity accounts have lost much of their nineteenth century sanctity. This loss presumably represents the law's response to changes in the way creditors assess financial risk. The
widespread adoption of low-par and no-par shares-an event initially
perceived by many as a serious threat to creditor protection' ' 2-and
the use of retained earnings as a financing device' 1 3 have weakened the
111. B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 14. The views of lenders tend to corroborate Manning's
statement. See Jean, supra note l10, at 42. A survey of senior lending officers conducted under
the auspices of Robert Morris Associates, a trade group, obtained the following pertinent lenders'
views of various attributes of term loans-defined for purposes of the survey as unsecured commercial loans with maturities from 3 to 10 years:
Obviously, in general, short term credit is repaid from seasonal movements, while term
loans depend upon realization of projected earnings in the majority of cases.. . . We
have had some difficulty with term loans, particularly where they were essentially capital
credits to businesses with inadequate record-of earnings. Term loans are harder to analyze correctly inasmuch as the primary emphasis has to be on profit projection rather
than balance sheet analysis and I think it probably will always be true that there will be more hazard in the long term credits.
Term Loans, BULL ROBT. MoRms Assocs., July 1957 Supp., at 11.
112. New York first allowed the use of shares without par value. This development, in 1912,
brought directly into question the utility of the legal capital system as a response to the way
creditors really behave. To many observers no-par stock signalled the law's wholesale abandonment of the protection previously afforded creditors through the trust-fund and holding-out theories. See Johnson v. Louisville Trust Co., 293 F. 857, 862 (6th Cir. 1923), cert denied, 264 U.S.
585 (1924); A. BERLE & G. MEAfNs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 254
(1932); Bonbright, The Dangers of Shares Without Par Value, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 449 (1924);
Cook, Stock Without Par Value, 7 A.B.A. J. 534, 534 (1921); Warren, The Progress of the Law.Corporations,34 HARe. L. REv. 282,286 (1921). By permitting the board of directors to allocate a
portion of the amount paid for shares to "surplus", and thereby render it eligible for return to the
shareholders, and by raising doubt about the shareholder's liability for watered stock, the acceptance of no-par produced results clearly inconsistent with the nineteenth century idea of nominal
capital as a sacrosanct fund. No-par was defended on the grounds that the corporation's credit did
not depend on its nominal capital; prospective creditors were much more interested in its present
financial condition and the track record of its management. See Ballantine, Stockholders'Ltabiliy
in Minnesota, 7 MINN. L. Rev. 79, 89-90, 96 (1923); Goodbar, No-ParStock-Its Nature and Use,
3 MAmi L.Q. 1, 12-13 (1948); Rice & Harno, Shares With No Par Value, 5 MINN. L. REv. 493,
494-95 (1921); Stevens, Stock Issues Under the Unform Business CorporationAct, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 399, 411-12, 417-18 (1928); Report of Committeeon a UniformIncorporationAct,HANDBOOK
OF NAT'L CONF. OF COM.'eS ON UNIFoRM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINOS OF 30TH ANN.

CONF. 144 (letter of Arthur W. Machen, Jr., draftsman of the seventh tentative draft). The evolution of financial accounting practices and the increased willingness of businesses to provide
financial statement information facilitated this position, see supra note 109 (authorities cited), and
it carried the day, both with the state legislatures and the businessmen. Corporate promoters and
managers, who would presumably have little incentive to employ a financing device that would
deter credit, made immediate and widespread use of no-par. See I A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL
POLICY OF CoRPORATIONs 59 n.f(Sth ed. 1953) (table indicating authorized classes ofpar and nopar stock contained in new charters of large corporations for the period 1915-1932).
113. For an indication of the importance of retained earnings as a financing source see FED.
REs. BULL, Jan. 1982, at A36-A37, tables 1.47 & 1.49. For the years 1978 through 1980 the
undistributed profits of United States corporations were $95.7, $117.6 and $107.2 billion respectively. Total after-tax profits were $140.3, $167.7 and $163.2 billion respectively, for an average
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creditor's technical right, under state law, to claim reliance on the full
amount of the shareholders' equity account as a source of protection.
For example, consider a shareholder who purchases, for $49, a share of
a corporation whose capitalization consists of one million shares of $1
par value stock. Its shareholders' equity, to use pre-1979 Model Business Corporation Act terminology,11 4 is $1 million in stated capital, $26
million in capital surplus and $22 million in earned surplus, for a total
of $49 million.115 Under most contemporary state statutes, the only
amount upon which the creditor is truly entitled to rely on as an equity
cushion is the stated capital, equivalent to $1 per share.'1 6 Thus, under
retention ratio of 68%. By contrast, the annual gross proceeds from new issues of securites for the
s .me period were $47.2, $51.5 and $73.7 billion respectively.
114. MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 2(j), (1), (in) (1969 rev.) (repealed 1979).
115. The relative amounts of these accounts were derived from the last audited balance sheet
of Equity Funding prior to its bankruptcy. The high proportion of surplus is not unusual for the
contemporary corporation. See general, W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORArIONS

1484-85 (4th ed. unabr. 1969).
116. Provided the corporation is not insolvent at the time of or immediately after the distribution-in the equity sense of not being able to pay its debts as they come due, see MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 2(n) (1969 rev.) (repealed 1979); CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1977); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 102(aX8) (McKinney 1963)--the entire $22 million of earned surplus could be distributed to shareholders as a dividend. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45 (1969 rev.)
(amended 1979); CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a) (West 1977); Dat CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)(1) (rev.
1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(a), (b) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-83). Most states would
also allow a distribution of the $26 million capital surplus. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 46 (rev.
1969) (amended 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(aXl) (rev. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 510(a), (b) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-83); f. CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (West Supp. 1981)
(requiring, in general, that after the distribution (I) tangible assets be at least 1.25 times liabilities
and (2) current assets be at least equal to current liabilities). Thus, the only true equity cushion
remaining is the $1 million in stated capital.
Even this amount is not necessarily sacred. The corporation's board and shareholder could
adopt resolutions reducing the par value of the shares to, for example, I0 per share and thereby
reduce stated capital to $100,000. The remaining $900,000 becomes capital surplus eligible for
distribution to shareholders. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 58(e), 69, 70 (rev. 1969). (In
1979 section 58(e) was amended and sections 69 and 70 were repealed); c. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, §§ 242(aX3),(b), 244(aX4) (rev. 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 801(bX10), 802(aX1) (McKinney 1963). For comments on the availability of capital reductions as a basis for distributions to
shareholders see W. CARtY & M. EisENBEao, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1381-83
(5th ed. unabr. 1980); D. HERwrrz., BUSINESS PLANNING 35052 358-59 (1966); B. MANNING,

supra note 18, at 67-68,70. New amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act weaken this
statutory protection even further by abandoning the concept of stated capital and permitting distributions to shareholders so long as (l).the corporation is not insolvent in the equity sense and (2)
a balance sheet test, requiring post-distribution assets to be at least equal to liabilities plus liquidation preferences on any senior equity securities, is satisfied. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 45(b)
(1979).
Professor Clark has pointed out that, notwithstanding the above analysis, fraudulent conveyance law may preserve some minimum equity cushion for creditors by permitting them to recover
from shareholders any distribution leaving a corporation with "unreasonably small capital." See
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5 (1918); 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B) (ii) (Supp. V
1981). This requirement, Clark argues, remains independent from and in addition to those provided by the legal capital statutes. Clark, .upra note 74, at 554-60. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE

32
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the strict logic of the reliance rationale, any securities law claim of the
shareholder should be subordinated only to the extent it exceeds $48.

Admittedly, many long-term lenders do not limit themselves to
this minimal state-law protection against dissipation of the equity cushion and have developed customized contractual arrangements to limit
the distribution of assets to shareholders. 1

7

The parties to such agree-

ments and indentures may properly claim "reliance" on something
greater than the state-mandated minimum capital, but this private contractual arrangement with the debtor provides little doctrinal support
for mandating across-the-board subordination of securities law
claims.118
Notwithstanding these historical changes, would the contemporary
business creditor regard the subordination doctrine as a material source
of protection? Most creditors probably would not, simply because subordination covers only priority in bankruptcy, a comparatively minor
aspect of the value of equity capital to corporate creditors. The primary function of equity capital in the leveraged firm is to buffer the
creditors against exposure to business risk by providing for a part of the
corporation's value that may be depleted by business losses without
threatening the corporation's ability to pay creditors in full. As we
have seen, the subordination doctrine does little to protect this cushion
aspect of the debt-equity relationship because prior to bankruptcy, se§ 506(d) (West 1977) (apparently adopting Clark's position) with MODEL BUSINESS CORxP. ACT

§ 152 (1979) (optional provision that legal capital rules supersede all other state law on distributions) and Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation ActAmendments to Rfnancal Provisions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1867, 1889 (1979) (drafters' comment on

MBCA § 152)..
117. See AmRICAN BAR

FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES

401-421 (1971); W.

CARY & M. EISENBERG, SIUro note 116, at 1391-95; B. MANNING, supra note 18, at 96-107; Kum-

mIert, State StatutoryRestrictions on FinancialDistributionsby Corporationsto ShareholdersPart1,
55 WAsH. L. Rnv. 359, 395-96 (1980). On the frequency of such covenants see Castle, Term Lend.
ing--A Guide to Negotiating Term Loan Covenants and Other FmancialRestrictions, 63 J. CoM.
BANK LENDINO, Nov. 1980, at 26, 32-33 (reporting results of survey by Chemical Bank of 37 term
loan agreements with industrial and transportation companies rated by Moody's; of these 23 [62%)
contained restrictions on dividends); Kummert, supra, at 374 n.63 (reporting results of survey of
100 corporations selected at random from Moody's InautrialManual;of the 98 corporations that
had long-term debt all but 12 had some form of restriction on cash dividends to shareholders);
Smith & Warner, On Fncidal Contracting: An Analyss of Bond Covenant, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117,
131 n.28 (1979) (citing the findings of an unpublished Ph.D. thesis that out of a random sample of
100 industrial firms, all had a dividend restriciton on at least one debt instrument).
118. Presumably, no one would seriously argue that shaieholders in a solvent corporation
would be barred from collecting upon a securities law class action judgment solely because payment of the judgment would cause the corporation to be in default under some of the provisions in
its various loan agreements. If the creditors" contractually-based reliance is insufficient to permit
them to immunize themselves against the risk of securities law claims in the case of the solvent
corporation, there is no reason why the result should be different once the corporation enters
bankruptcy.
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curities law claimants can withdraw value from the corporation at any
time. 119

The subordination doctrine actually removes only one class of
business risks, securities law claims, from the possible sources of competing claims in bankruptcy. Realistically, protection against this risk
is unlikely to figure materially in the deliberations of a prospective
lender. For a lender to receive any benefit from the subordination rule,
three events have to occur. (1) the debtor must commit a fraud or some
other securities violation on a scale that entitles its securityholders to
obtain a judgment against it for a material amount; (2) the debtor must
become bankrupt; and (3) the securityholders must fail to discover and
liquidate their claims prior to bankruptcy. If the typical prospective
creditor views this combination a likely contingency of the debtor, it
will not seek comfort within the confines of the subordination rule; it
will refuse to make the loan. 20
3. ConclusionsAbout the Reliance Rationale. In sum, for the reliance rationale to afford a satisfactory basis for treating a creditors' risk
of securities law claims against the debtor differently from risks of
other competing claims over the course of a loan, one of two conclu119. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
120. Admittedly, some marginal lending decisions may be affected by the subordination doctrine's applicability. Consider a bank loan to a small, unproven company when the lender is
willing to take the risk because of the prospects for future growth and business. The bank discovers that the company has committed "technical" violations of the registration or other requirements of state and federal securities law at the time of its initial capitalization, a not infrequent
occurrence in companies lacking highly experienced securities counsel, see A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 47 (1976); C. IsRAELs & 0. DUFF,WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 52
(1962) (comment of D. Henkel); Bromberg, Curing Securies Violations: Rescission Offers and
Other Techniques, 1 J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (1975), with the result that those who purchased shares as a
part of this capitalization have a statutory right to rescind and recover the money they paid, see
Securities Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77/ (1976); Uniform Securities Act § 410(a). The bank realizes
that as long as the company's fortunes continue to climb the shareholders have no incentive to
rescind, but in view of the company's youth and the riskiness of its business, the bank cannot rest
assured that the prosperity will continue forever. Even here, however, the subordination rule is
not clearly critical to the bank's ability to protect itself against shareholders' rescission claims. If
the grounds for rescission involve only registration violations, the statute of limitations is relatively short; the period under the federal Securities Act is one year from the date of the violation.
Securities Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976); cf Uniform Securities Act §410(e) (two years from
sale). If the statute still has a substantial time to run, the bank may choose to foreclose securities
law claims by insisting that the company make a rescission offer to potential claimants, a relatively
common practice in other contexts. See generally Bromberg, supra. There is some doubt whether
this practice is effective to extinguish the rights of those who fail to accept the offer. Compare
UNiFoRm SECURmES ACT § 410(e) (rights extinguished by nonacoceptance); FEDERAL SECURITIES
CODE § 1727(gX1X1978) (similar) with Meyers v. C&M Petroleum Producers, Inc., 476 F.2d 427
(5th Cir.) (no extinction of federal rights for failure to accept 10-day rescission offer, case may turn
on the short time period as opposed to an unconditonaloffer of rescission), cert denied, 414 U.S.
829 (1973). Both the statute of limitations and the voluntary rescission offer provide the bank
more protection than the subordination doctrine, which is triggered only in bankruptcy.
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sions must be made. Either the rationale reflects the implied understandings of both creditors and shareholders, or it has a beneficial
impact on the cost or availability of business financing. There is little
evidence to support the first proposition. As to the second, any detrimental impact on the cost or availability of debt financing resulting
from a rule of parity may be offset by a commensurate beneficial impact on the cost and availability of equity financing. Further, a realistic
appreciation of the limited effect that the subordination doctrine has on
the risks faced by prospective business lenders makes it unlikely that
the doctrine would have any material impact on most credit
decisions. 121
C.

The "Best-of-Both- Worlds" Rationale.

The second principal argument made in support of the subordination doctrine assesses the risks voluntarily assumed by a shareholder.
In a leveraged firm equityholders accept a junior position in exchange
for the exclusive right to all assets in excess of the amount necessary to
satisfy the fixed claims of creditors. If the firm prospers, creditors cannot renounce their status and share this increased value with the equityholders. Supporters of subordination argue, therefore, that if the firm
fails, equityholders should not be permitted to employ the federal securities laws to participate on a par with creditors. Because this argument is concerned with the seeming unfairness of permitting
shareholders to switch to creditor status, it will be referred to as the
best-of-both-worlds rationale.
Like the reliance rationale, this argument has a long history. As
one of the leading American decisions of the late-nineteenth century
put it: "[w]hen a corporation becomes bankrupt the temptation to lay
aside the garb of a stockholder, on one pretense or another, and to
assume the role of a creditor, is very strong, and all attempts of that
kind should be viewed with suspicion." 1
Because of this concern, many of the early American courts, although phrasing their opinions in the conventional terms of laches and
121. Consider Professor Shuchman's general comments:
[W]e do not know too much about the actual impact on creditors' costs of most legislative changes that appear to increase legal risk in credit transactions, at least as regards
those that are within the range generally attempted, excluding the usual extreme hypothetical changes.... The potential risk in the bankruptcy law may only be realized in
the relatively few loans that result in both default and bankruptcy;, and the actual costs of
the realized risk are difficult to determine and probably not often calculated by lenders.
Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Banknipfcjr The Spherical CMcken, 41 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 66, 94 (footnotes omitted).
122. Newton Nat'l Bank v. Newbegin, 74 F. 135, 140 (8th Cir. 1896).
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similar equitable doctrines,1 23 required unusually rigorous diligence
when faced with a shareholder's attempt to rescind postdated insolvency.' 24 This suspicion of shareholders who attempted rescission may
explain why these courts were nonetheless willing to allow shareholders
to obtain relief if they had taken some initial step to25rescind prior to the
commencement of formal insolvency proceedings.
Slain and Kripke do not focus on shareholder behavior, however.
They focus on what they regard as two distinct risks inherent in the
conflict between contract creditors and securities law claimants: (1) the
risk of insolvency, from whatever cause; and (2) the risk of securities
123. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
124. See Farrar v. Walker, 8 F. Cas. 1076, 1078 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1875) (No. 4,679); Duffield v.
E.T. Barnum Wire & Iron Works, 64 Mich. 293, 301-03, 31 N.W. 310, 314-15 (1887) (affirming a
lower court decision on a 2-2 vote); Dunn v. State Bank, 59 Minn. 221, 228-29, 61 N.W. 27, 28-29
(1894); Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28, 52-56, 26 S.E. 591, 598-99 (1897). These
authorities suggest that the rescinding shareholder had an affirmative duty to investigate the company's financial condition, including exercising his right to examine corporate books and records.
See also In re Recording Devices Co., I F.2d 474, 476-77 (S.D. Ohio 1924) (language to similar
effect). But see Hinkley v. Sac Oil & Pipe Line, 132 Iowa 396, 409-10, 107 N.W. 629, 634 (1906);
Duffield v. E.T. Barnum Wire & Iron Works, 64 Mich. at 306-07, 31 N.W. at 316 (dissenting
opinion). As a result, a shareholder holding his shares for more than a few months after a fraud
faced an almost insurmountable burden in proving that he had acted with the requisite promptness. By contrast, the traditional laches standard places the buyer under no general duty to investigate and requires him to take action only if sufficient facts come to his attention to put him on
notice that an inquiry is needed. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1677 (2d ed. 1961); Friedman, Delay as a Bar to Rescission, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 426, 432-34 (1941). Contemporary civil antifraud liability under the federal securities laws sets a comparable "inquiry notice" standard in
determining when the statute of limitations period begins to run. See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573
F.2d 685, 694-98 (1st Cir. 1978); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917-18 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. dented, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Dale v. Rosenfeld, 229 F.2d 855, 858 (2d Cir. 1956).
125. See Goess v. A.D.H. Holding Corp., 85 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1936); Hinkley v. Sac Oil & Pipe
Line Co., 132 Iowa 396, 410-12, 107 N.W. 629, 634-35 (1906); Fear v. Bartlett, 81 Md. 435, 32 A.
322 (1895); Savage v. Bartlett, 78 Md. 561, 28 A. 414 (1894); Gordon v. Ralston, 155 Ore. 310,31516, 62 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1936). Even the English courts, which had adopted an absolute rule barring rescission after winding-up, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text, made the same
exception. Reese River Silver Mining Co. v. Smith, 4 L.R.-E. & I. App. 64 (1869). In the American cases, the exception appeared to apply even if the issuer was insolvent at the time of rescission,
so long as formal proceedings had not yet commenced. See Hinkley v. Sac Oil & Pipe Line Co.,
132 Iowa at 410-12, 107 N.W. at 635; Fear v. Bartlett, 81 Md. at 444, 32 A. at 323 (dicta). But see
Tennent v. City of Glasgow Bank, 4 App. Cas. 615 (1879) (ScoL) (rescission barred when shareholder brought suit prior to winding-up but after it had become public knowledge that the issuerbank had stopped payment). Permitting the shareholder to rescind in these cases could decrease
the recovery of contract creditors who may have relied upon his subscription. In this sense, the
"best-of-both-worlds" concern--or more accurately the lack of it-supercedes the reliance concern. The lack of any best-of-both-worlds problem may also help explain Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 301 U.S. 206 (1937). See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
The plaintiff in Oppenheimer had acknowledged and satisfied his statutory liability, thus he could
not be hedging his bets at the expense of creditors by seeking to participate as a general creditor.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1983:1

law violations. 26 They argue that the absojite priority rule reflects the
different degrees to which creditors and sliareholders assume the first
risk and that there is no obvious reason for reallocating it through the
mechanism of securities law claims. 127 The traditional securities law
remedies of rescission and deceit-based damages provide a basis for
illustrating this potential reallocation of investment risk. The equitable
remedy of rescission, which is encountered repeatedly in the historical
development of the subordination doctrine, permits a defrauded shareholder to return to his pre-investment position by tendering his shares
to the seller in return for the consideration paid. 28 The common law
tort action in deceit 29 permits the shareholder to recover damages
30
equal to the difference between the amount he paid for his shares
and their true value at the time of purchase. To a considerable extent
investors' statutory remedies under modem state and federal securities
laws are derived from these two basic forms of relief, so a problem
exploring their effects will help assess the best-of-both-worlds reallocation concern raised by Slain and Kripke.
Suppose a group of promoters has recently organized Diversified
Mining Company (DMC) around two assets, a copper mine and a silver mine, each valued on DMC's books at $500,000. The promoters set
the company's capitalization at $1 million, consisting of 10,000 shares
of common stock. Half the stock will be sold to the public at $100 per
share and half retained by the promoters. As it begins business, DMC
has no liabilities.
126. See Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 286-88; Kelce v. U.S. Fin., Inc., 648 F.2d 515, 520
(9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,451 U.S. 970 (1981); Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.),
579 F.2d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979); H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6156.
127. For the arguments concerning the second risk see infra text accompanying note 198.
128. See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.15, at 603-05 (1956); 3 L.

Loss,supra note 124, at 1626-27; W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-87
(4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT OF REsTrruTiON §§ 8, 28 (1937).
129. See generally I F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 128, § 7.15; 3 L. Loss, supra note 124,
at 1628-30; W. PROSSER, supra note 128, § 150, at 685-87; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
525-49 (1976).
130. In some cases the shareholder could recover the amount the shares were represented to be

worth if this were higher than the amount he paid. This raises the distinction between out-ofpocket and benefit-of-the-bargain damage measures in deceit actions. The first Restatement of
Torts adopted the out-of-pocket rule and limited plaintiffs' recoveries to the difference between
the amount paid for the security and its actual value, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 549(a) (1938), on
the grounds that deceit actions sounded in tort, the purpose ofwhich was to compensate the victim
for his actual loss. The vast majority of American courts, however, adopted the more generous
benefit-of-the-bargain measure of recovery. As a result, the Restatement (Second) of Torts permits this additional recovery in business transactions if proven with reasonable certainty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) commentg (1976); id ,Note to Institute (Tent. Draft No.

11, 1965).
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DMC's public offering prospectus stated that each mine's $500,000
valuation resulted from independent appraisals. The prospectus also
contained glowing reports of the projected output of the mines, again
purportedly on the basis of independent appraisals. In fact, although
the statements about the copper mine are true, those about the silver
mine are total falsehoods. The promoters purchased the silver mine for
$5,000 one month before forming the corporation and never bothered
to obtain an independent appraisal because the property appeared
worthless. The first year of the mines' operation confirms that the silver mine is worthless, and a precipitous and unexpected fall in the price
of copper causes the copper mine, though productive, to become unprofitable. Its working capital exhausted, DMC ceases operations and
enters bankruptcy. At this point Alphonse, an investor who purchased
100 shares of DMC stock in the public offering, learns of the misrepresentations and seeks to rescind and recover the $10,000 he paid for his
shares.
Consider Alphonse's economic position immediately before and
after his purchase of stock.. Before, he had $10,000 cash. After, he has
shares representing a 1/100 interest in a copper mine worth $500,000
and a 1/100 interest in another piece of real estate worth no more than
$5000, a total value of $5050. As a result of the purchase, Alphonse
suffers an immediate and tangible loss of $4950. This "fraud loss" corresponds to the second of the two risks identified by Professors Slain
and Kripke: the risk of securities law violations. The further erosion of
Alphonse's investment because of the decline in the copper market is,
on the other hand, a "business loss" that corresponds to the first of the
risks identified by Slain and Kripke: the risk of insolvency.
If Alphonse obtains restitution of his full $10,000 purchase price,
he receives compensation for both of these losses. This would appear
to permit Alphonse improperly to evade the risk of an uncertain copper
market. Alphonse assumed the risk of loss resulting from that weak.
market as a quid pro quo for the opportunity he had to benefit from a
favorable one. In short, allowing him to use the rescissory remedy to
recoup this business loss along with his fraud loss would give Alphonse
the best-of-both-worlds.
Alphonse may respond that he could not have given his full, cognitive consent to the risks of business loss inherent in DMC because he
had invested on the basis of defective information.13 1 If Alphonse must
bear the business loss portion of his total losses, the law has treated him
131. The SEC has made essentially this argument. See SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVxSION, 197S Senate Hearingssupra note 3, at 759-60;, SEC REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY REVISION,

1976 House Hearingssupra note 3. at 2184-86.
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like an investor who voluntarily decided to pay $5050 in exchange for a
1/100 interest in a copper mine and a 1/100 interest in nonmining real
estate. But nothing indicates that Alphonse would have knowingly
consented to this investment. Perhaps his inveatment interests lay primarily in silver and DMC seemed an attractive company, notwithstanding its copper activities, because it appeared to offer a good "play"
in silver. Alternatively, Alphonse may be an experienced securities analyst who concluded, on the basis of an empirical study of mining
stocks, that copper and silver prices have a negative correlation and
therefore considered DMC a unique opportunity for low-risk mining
investment. In any case, holding Alphonse to his business loss treats
him as consenting to an investment perhaps very different from the one
he thought he was making. Rescission avoids such treatment; it provides a remedy for loss of investment choice as well as any loss of investment value caused by securities fraud.
In Alphonse's case, the "cost" of any restitutional relief he and
other public shareholders obtain will fall on nonrescinding shareholders-probably the promoters. Because the promoters induced Alphonse to make the DMC investment, the arguments in the preceding
paragraph suggest that they, rather than Alphonse, should bear Alphonse's business loss. Rescission achieves this result as long as the
promoters' own funds remain at risk.
Suppose, however, that after the public offering, DMC borrowed
$500,000 from a local bank and used the money to acquire and retire
the promoter's stock. Now the cost of restitution will fall in part on the
bank. This strengthens the argument that Alphonse should bear the
portion of his losses attributable to business risks; although his consent
to this risk was tainted, Alphonse did enjoy an opportunity for upside
appreciation not available to the bank. This argument, based on the
relationship between business loss and rescission, is the essence of
Slain's and Kripke's objection to any reallocation of insolvency risk; it
does not, however, make sense with respect to fraud losses.
132
Certainly Alphonse did not agree to the risk of being defrauded.
Furthermore, recompensing his fraud losses causes no best-of-bothworlds problem. Because of the fraud, Alphonse suffered a direct and
immediate loss of investment value at the time he purchased his shares.
As previously suggested, allowing him to recover this $4950 fraud loss
will place him in the same position as another mythical investor; Gaston, who knowingly invested $5050 to purchase a 1/100 interest in a
company owning the copper mine and barren real estate. Alphonse's
132. Id
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opportunity for profit and exposure to loss were never any different
from those of Gaston even though Alphonse's expectations were higher
because of DMC's falsehoods; therefore, placing Alphonse in the same
financial position as Gaston does not allow Alphonse to renounce any
risk voluntarily assumed or provide him any unfair advantage vis-a-vis
contract creditors. Rather, compensating Alphonse for this fraud loss
merely assures that the net price he pays for the package of opportunity
and risk he received is the same as what Gaston presumably would
accomplishes this
have paid: $5050. The traditional deceit remedy
33
damages.
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loss also responds to another concern embraced by the best-of-bothworlds argument. Suppose that Alphonse never knew of the $500,000
appraisal of the silver mine, or that he knew of it but it did not affect
his investment decision.'3 4 Arguably, if he would have purchased the
DMC shares in the absence of the fraud, permitting him to recover
either his fraud loss or his business loss at the company's demise gives
him a windfall.
Traditional tort law addresses this problem of causal connection
between the fraud and the investor's decisionmaking by requiring objective proof of the materiality of the fraudulent statement and proof of
the investor's subjective reliance on it.' 35 Increasingly, however, courts
have dispensed with individual reliance requirements, or have presumed them met, subject to rebuttal, in cases involving publicly-traded
securities by reasoning that the plaintiff relied on the general integrity
of the market to assure a fair price. 36 Two arguments support this
133. The text suggests that the out-of-pocket rather than the benefit-of-the-bargain rule provides the appropriate measure of investor participation. See supra note 130. Active market transactions in a truly efficient market, see infra note 137, should eliminate the distinction between
these two measures. The actions of informed traders would bring the market price of the security
into line with the value suggested by the issuer's representations to the market place. Whether or
not a truly efficient market exists, creditors should not have to subsidize investors' unrealized
expectations that the security was worth more than they paid for it.
134. This seems unlikely with a fraud as palpable as DMC's, but certainly possible in the more
typical examples of securities fraud by public corporations--such as premature recognition of
income or inventory overvaluation--and the modem shareholder who has a variety of information sources and a wide spectrum of reasons for purchasing stock.
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 537-38 (1976); cf. RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION §§ 9(1), (2), comment a (1937) (for purposes of restitution, fraud must be the "inducement"
for the transaction; innocent misrepresentation must also be material). The express remedies
available under the Securities Act, in contrast, do not impose a direct reliance requirement. Securities Act §§ 11, 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 771(2) (1976).
136. See Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nor Price
Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 103 S.Ct. 434 (1982); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir.
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"fraud-on-the-market" theory.
First, many investors depend on the advice of professionals such
as brokers, securities analysts, financial columnists and others in making investment decisions; thus although the plaintiff may not have relied directly on the fraudulent statement in question, he or she may be
acting on the recommendation of someone who did. Second, there is
the efficient-market theory, which holds that the market price of a security impounds all of the publicly available information concerning its
value. 137

This latter point suggests that whether or not Alphonse personally
relied on the fraud in making his investment decision, it injured him.
Had DMC disclosed the true value of the silver mine, Alphonse would
have paid no more than $5050 for his shares because the collective actions of informed traders in the market would have tended to hold the
price at that average level. Thus, giving Alphonse a damages award
that places him in an equal financial position with Gaston represents a
truly realistic1 38 reconstruction of the economic position he would have
enjoyed but for the fraud.
The example of Alphonse and Gaston demonstrates that the bestof-both-worlds concern arises not so much from the rule of parity and
securities law claims in general, but from the particular remedy of rescission. The early court decisions that developed the subordination
t39 Simidoctrine dealt almost exclusively with a rescissory remedy.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906-08 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 142-46 (N.D.
Tex. 1980). See generally Fischel, Use of Modern FinanceTheory in SecuritiesFraudCases Involving Actively TradedSecurities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 9-10 (1982); Note, The Fraudon-the-MarketTheory, 95 HARv. L. Rnv. 1143 (1982). These cases have arisen under rule l0b-5, which otherwise
requires plaintiffs to prove reliance when predicating liability on an affirmative misrepresentation.
137. This particular formulation of the efficient-markets hypothesis, that the information reflected by the price of the security includes all publicly available information, represents the
"semistrong' version of the hypothesis. For general discussions of efficient-markets theory and
the evidence supporting it see E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133-68 (1976); J. LORIE & M.
HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET-THEoRY AND EVIDENCE 70-97 (1973); B. MALKIEL, A RAN-

DOM WALK DoWN WALL STREET pt. 2passnn (2d ed. 1981); Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A
Review of Theory andEmpiricalWork, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). For discussion of the implications of
the theory for securities law remedies see generally Fischel, Use ofModern Finance Theory in
Securities FraudCasesInvolving Actively TradedSecurities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1, 9-10 (1982); Pickholz
& Horahan, The SEC'S Version of the Effllent Market Theory and Its Impact on Securities Law
Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (1982).
138. If anything the award is conservative in that the alternative assumption is that, absent the
fraud, Alphonse would not have purchased the shares at all; in which case only rescission can
reconstruct his prior economic position.
139. Several factors may explain this. First, as in the case of Alphonse, rescission offers a
prospect for greater recovery than deceit because it compensates both fraud and business losses.
Early cases typically involved a fraud asserted defensively to avoid liability on a share subscrip-
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larly, Professors Slain and Kripke focus on rescission, as the introduction to their article and the references and examples they employ in
their analysis indicate. Perhaps if the conflict between contract creditors and defrauded shareholders had arisen principally through assertion of deceit claims, the result would have been different.14t
Rescission fails to require a causal link between the fraud and the victim's loss and thus permits a best-of-both-worlds choice. The deceit

remedy of damages cures this problem by compensating the shareholder for fraud loss but not business loss and thereby prevents any
after-the-fact renunciation of risk. Consequently, the most direct and
theoretically honest way to address the best-of-both-worlds concern is
not through blanket subordination. Instead, securities law claims
should be accorded parity, with their participation limited to an
amount consistent with investors' out-of-pocket damages and the bal-

ance of the claim, if any, subordinated.1 4 '

tion. Rescission would excuse the shareholder from his subscription. A deceit remedy, on the
other hand, would require the subscriber to honor his subscription, with the deceit claim representing either a set-off or, worse, a separate claim against the issuer's limited assets. Second, in
Britain, the House of Lords held rescission a prerequisite to a deceit action. See Houldsworth v.
City of Glasgow Bank, 5 App. Cas. 317 (1880) (Scot). Because the initiation of winding-up cut off
the shareholders' rights to rescind, see supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text, it also cut off
deceit actions. Third, in the United States, unliquidated deceit claims were generally held not
"provable" under section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976), and thus could not
participate in a straight bankruptcy, the form most of the early cases took. A rescission and restitution claim, on the other hand, plausibly sounded in quasi-contract, provable under section
63a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(4) (1976), as a claim founded on "a contract express or implied." Allegaert v. Perot, 466 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cawthon v. BancoKentucky Co., 52 F.2d 850
(W.D. Ky. 1931); Inre Bancunity Corp., 36 F.2d 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); see generally Note, Securities
Claims i Bankruptcr Proyablity and Priority, 53 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1056 (1978). The new
Bankruptcy Code generally abandons the requirements of provability. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 502(a),
101 (4) (definition of "claim") (Supp. V 1981).
140. Few cases involved deceit actions, but at least one supports this notion. See Dorsey
Mach. Co. v. McCaffrey, 139 Ind.545,552-53,38 N.E. 208,211 (1894). Butsee Dennis v. Thompson, 240 Ky. 727, 729-30, 43 S.W.2d 18, 19-20 (1931) (applying rescission authorities to a deceit
claim without considering the distinction).
141. As a practical matter, the amount of the shareholder's claim against publicly held corporations may be limited to the out-of-pocket measure by the terms of the available federal securities
law remedies. The antifraud remedy applicable to misstatements in registration statements, section IIof the Securities Act, includes an affirmative defense reducing the plaintiffs damages by
the amount of any loss in value that the defendant can prove is attributable to causes other than
the misstatements. Securities Act § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976). Thus, in the DMC hypothetical, if the defendants prove that a portion of Alphonse's loss was caused by the declines in the
copper market, the amount of his damages will be decreased accordingly. Also, in the case of the
omnibus antifraud remedy, rule lOb-5, courts have limited the plaintiff to the out-of-pocket measure of damages when the claim is based on purchases of shares in the open market. Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 553-56 (5th Cir. 1981), afd in part,rey'd in part on other
grounds, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th
Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion); Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,224-27 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
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Also related to the best-of-both-worlds concern is the doctrine of
laches. At the heart of the concern is the defrauded shareholder's opportunity to retain his, shares if, notwithstanding the fraud, the issuer
prospers, but to rescind and demand the return of his investment if it
does not. The equitable doctrine of laches responds directly to this
concern by requiring the shareholder to decide promptly on discovering the fraud whether he wants to stay in or get out. 42 Some securities
law remedies are subject to a laches defense, 14 3 and there is no reason
why it should not apply with equal force once the issuer enters

bankruptcy.

144

Laches does not completely solve the best-of-both-worlds problem, however, because it is triggered only when a fraud is or should
have been discovered. Experience suggests that in cases in which the
subordination doctrine could be applied, fraud comes to light only on
the eve of bankruptcy, if not later. At that point shareholders do not
hedge their bets to see whether the issuer recovers, but rather race to
the courthouse, seeking to take the lead in any class action litigation.
As the DMC problem demonstrates, a successful action for rescission at
afdmem, 556 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1977). The antifraud and nonregistration remedies created
by Securities Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 770) (1976), on the other hand, employ a rescission based
measure of recovery. But these remedies, like the equitable remedy of rescission, require contractual privity between plaintiff and defendant. Thus, they will not often be asserted against the
publicly held issuer by shareholder plaintiffs.
142. For this reason, the laches doctrine functions as an anti-hedging or anti-straddle rule.
See Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 293.
143. Several courts predicating rescission on rule lOb-5 have held that the plaintifi's failure to
be diligent in bringing suit bars any resort to the remedy. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488
F.2d 912, 915-18 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571,
574-75 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312
F.2d 210, 214 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1962), in which the court, holding that the plaintiff's
actions amounted to an election to rescind, stated:
Where parties have the right to rescind, they cannot delay the exercise of that right to
determine whether avoidance or affirmance will be more profitable to them. This is
particularly true where the transaction is one of a speculative nature.. . . In the transaction herein involved it would doubtlessly have been more advantageous for the appellant to have had the benefit of claiming a rescission of the contract if a loss was
imminent, and to disclaim the rescission if a profit was apparent.
Id at 532.
On the other hand, although the nature of the relief sounds in rescission, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that the defense of laches does not apply to actions under
section 12 of the Securities Act; only the statute of limitations bars such suits. Straley v. Universal
Uranium & Milling Corp., 289 F.2d 370,372-73 (9th Cir. 1961). Of course, a preclusion of rescission, if laches does apply to a cause of action, will not affect a plaintifrs right to damages. Baumel
v. Rosen, 412 F.2d at 575.
144. Slain and Kripke suggest that the equitable nature of bankruptcy jurisdiction improves
the technical case for applying the laches doctrine because it undermines the argument that laches
should not apply to a remedy at law. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 293 n.108.
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this point, whether or not viewed as prompt with respect to discovery of
the fraud, permits shareholders to deflect the business risks of their investment. As the DMC problem also shows, holding shareholders to
their out-of-pocket damages solves this problem. Even assuming that
shareholders become aware of a fraud prior to insolvency, they can
collect this measure of damages and still continue to bet on the issuer
by retaining their shares. Therefore, permitting an out-of-pocket recovery does not represent a reward for hedging at the expense of creditors.
For these reasons, limiting recoveries to out-of-pocket damages responds better to the best-of-both-worlds problem than does the laches
doctrine. Limiting recovery eliminates the best-of-both-worlds problem because no better world exists for the shareholder to choose.
D. Creditorsas Innocent Nonpartiesto the Fraudand the 'Revolution
in Securities Regulation"
The two preceding sections cover the theories traditionally advanced in support of subordination, but some lesser rationales remain.
Although not articulated as clearly as the reliance and best-of-bothworlds rationales, these arguments played a role in the acceptance of
the subordination doctrine. Language in some of the early court opinions 145 suggests the following line of reasoning. Generally, defrauded
shareholders have the right to seek recovery from the assets of the issuer and other persons responsible for the fraud. In insolvency, however, innocent creditors succeed to the beneficial interest in the issuer's
assets. Because these creditors, unlike the issuer, were neither parties to
the fraud nor responsible for it, its consequences should not "bind"
them. Perhaps similar reasoning underlies Slain's and Kripke's contention that creditors should not bear any portion of the risk of illegal
securities issuance because the stock was not offered to them. t46 In any
event, this reasoning implies that defrauded shareholders' claims
against the assets of an issuer deserve deferral to those of innocent
creditors, and that shareholders should seek their recovery from others
directly responsible for the fraud, such as the issuer's officers, directors
and accountants.
The two sections that follow evaluate this argument from different
perspectives. Section 1 examines its substantive logic. Section 2 considers the argument as one part of a larger adverse reaction to the expansion of securities law liability during the 1960s and early 1970s.
145. See, eg., Howard v. Glenn, 85 Ga. 238, 260-61, 11 S.E. 610,611-12 (1890); Saffold v.
Barnes, 39 Miss. 399,402 (1860); Moosbrugger v. Walsh, 96 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 564,568,35 N.Y.S. 550,
552 (App. Div. 1895); Dettra v. Kestner, 147 Pa. 566, 579, 23 A. 889, 890 (1892).
146. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 288; see also supra text accompanying note 126.
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1. The Inconsistency of the "Innocent Creditors" Argument.
The premise that fraud should not "bind" innocent, nonparty creditors
has no doctrinal support. Any person with debt or equity claims
against an issuer necessarily stands subject to all competing and senior
claims that either have arisen or may arise against the issuer by the
actions of its agents. The basic principles of authority and respondeat
superior establish the issuer's responsibility and liability for the fraud
perpetrated by its agents, just as in other tort or contract cases. That
the actions of the agent were wrongful or unlawful does not alter their
attribution to the issuer.147 In this sense fraud "binds" innocent creditors in exactly the same way as does liability for personal injuries inflicted by the negligent conduct of an issuer's truck drivers or the illadvised decisions of its management to expand into unprofitable lines
of business.
When fraud victims recover a judgment against a solvent issuer,
the recovery is not at the expense of the issuer except in the most abstract sense, but its common shareholders. 48 When a modem publiclyheld corporation is involved, any attempt to treat these shareholders as
less "innocent" or more responsible for the fraud than corporate creditors is unjustified. In theory, perhaps the shareholders may be charged
with responsibility because they elect the board of directors, which in
turn appoints the officers and other agents. In reality, however, public
shareholders of a corporation usually have little voice in who the managers are or how they behave; a large creditor is likely to have much
more control, particularly as the corporation edges toward insolvency.
For most public shareholders and creditors alike the only meaningful
opportunity for exercising choice of management lies in the so-called
"Wall Street rule": the decision whether to invest in the issuer in the
first place and whether to get out if the investment becomes unsatisfactory. Fraud taints this choice equally for equity and debt.
Another possible ground for distinguishing antifraud recovery at
the expense of corporate creditors from that at the expense of share147. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
938 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 249, 257-58, 261-62 (1957); c/.id § 231 ("An
act may be within the scope of employment although consciously criminal or tortious.").
148. Judge Friendly alluded to this problem in his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Su(lur:
As has been well said.. . "One source of perplexity as to the appropriate bounds of the
civil remedy for misleading filings is that any remedy imposed against the issuer itself is
indirectly imposed on all holders of the common stock, usually the most important segment of the total category of investors intended to be protected." Cohen, Truth in Securi.
ties Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340, 1370 (1967) ....
[Liarge judgments, [are]
payable in the last analysis by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their
lawyers. ...
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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holders is that some shareholders, at least in theory, enjoy an opportunity to benefit from the fraud. If fraud increases the market price of an
issuer's shares to $50 when their true value is $30, then shareholders
benefit because they can sell out at the higher price. But not all will.
Suppose that when the price reaches $50, one-half sell out but the remaining shareholders hold their shares. The fraud is then discovered
and the price falls back to $30. Continuing shareholders must now
bear not only that loss but also their portion of the issuer's liability to
their defrauded fellow shareholders who purchased at $50, in effect
costing the continuing group an additional $10 per share. Telling them
that this is fair because they, too, had an opportunity to sell out at a
higher price is not likely to satisfy them.
Justifying subordination of shareholders' fraud claims against an
issuer in bankruptcy on the related ground that shareholders have recourse against other defendants also implies a nonexistent distinction
between situations in which the issuer is solvent and those in which it is
insolvent. The same defendants exist regardless of whether bankruptcy
proceedings have begun. If anything, bankruptcy weakens any argument for constraining the fraud plaintiffs to nonissuer defendants. The
Supreme Court's adoption of a scienter standard for liability under rule
lOb-5149 narrows the class of permissible defendants to those active in
the fraud. Sometimes "outsiders" such as accounting or brokerage
firms bear fraud liability, but more often the principal nonissuer defendants are members of the issuer's management. Their personal
wealth frequently depends on the fortunes of the issuer. The issuer's
insolvency and the expenses of the fraud and bankruptcy litigation
make these defendants poor targets for successful execution of large
judgments.' 5
2. Subordination as a Reaction to the 'Revolution in Securities
Regulation." As Congress and the federal courts fill in the various elements of private recovery under the securities laws, they presumably
focus on the ordinary case in which the economic burden of a recovery
falls on the culpable party. Thus, motives of penalizing the violator
may share equally with the objective of defining the appropriate cir149. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
150. See, eg., Paltrow, Goldblum Now in Consultingandon Parole, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1982,

at 31, coL 3 (comment of attorney for Equity Funding's shareholders that at least five investigations conducted during the litigation failed to turn up evidence that Goldblum, Equity Funding's
chairman, had significant assets other than Equity Funding stock); Notice of Proposed Voluntary
Dismissal of Class Action, Jezarian v. Csapo, No. 72 Civ. 1671 (DBB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1982)
(advising class members that named plaintiffs seek dismissal of action against the senior officers of

Stirling Homex Corp. because none of those defendants appeared able to satisfy a judgment for a
significant amount).
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cumstances for compensating the victim. To the extent that contempo-

rary private securities law remedies go beyond a strictly compensatory
objective, in the interests of creating an in terrorem deterrent as a supplement to governmental enforcement, 51 perhaps the "bite" of these
remedies should not apply to the bankrupt issuer's creditors. 152 This
theory comports with the general bankruptcy doctrine that claims for
fines, penalties, and punitive damages should not participate on a par
with other claims of general creditors.

53

Subordination proponents may well have been influenced by this
reasoning because of trends in securities law at that time. The Slain and

Kripke article was dated May 1973; the report of the Bankruptcy Commission was released in July 1973. This coincides with the high-water
mark of opportunities for recovery under the federal securites laws, especially rule lOb-5.1 54 Some decisions suggested that even persons who
did not actually purchase or sell a security in response to the fraud, but
merely failed to take advantage of an opportunity to purchase or sell,
or had indirect involvement in a purchase or sale, could recover under

that rule. 55 Others implied that a plaintiff did not necessarily need to
prove scienter, that recovery might be available based on the defend151. Courts and commentators differ on whether the laws embody such a policy. Compare
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913

(1970); Brief for Securities & Exchange Commissicn as Intervenor, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) quotedin Bishop, New Problems in Indemnfying
andinsuringDirectors: ProtectionAgainstLiability Underthe FederalSecuritiesLaws, 1972 DuKE
LJ.1153, 1162; Shulman, CiiiLiabilityandtheSecuritiesAct, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 253 (1933) (all of

which assert that the probable primary objective of civil liability under the 1933 Act is to compel
compliance) with Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976)
concurring) (discussing need to limit measure of lOb-5 damages to the portion of the
(Sneed, J.,
plaintiff's loss proximately caused by the violation); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,906 (9th Cir.
1975) ("The 10b-5 action remains compensatory . . . ."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976);
Bishop, UnderstandingD & 0 Insurance Policies, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1978, at 20, 21
(purpose of liability under federal securities laws is primarily to compensate victims rather than to
punish violators); Exchange Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976) (no recovery under Exchange
Act in excess of "actual damages" on account of the violation).
152. Consistent with the analysis in the preceding subsection of the text, this objection applies
when the issuer is solvent and the shareholders bear the cost of any recovery. Because the officers
and directors responsible for the fraud may be criticized by the board or the shareholders for
subjecting the issuer to liability, imposing such liability on a solvent issuer may also deter the
individuals actually responsible for the fraud.
153. Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981).
154. Discussing private actions under the rule in 1975, Justice Rehnquist characterized them
as "a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn," Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975), which "presents a danger of vexatiousness different
in degree and kind from that which accompanies litigation in general." Id at 739.
155. See Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973), rey'd, 421
U.S. 723 (1975); Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
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ant's negligence.1 56 Finally, some decisions raised the possibility that
rule lOb-5 could remedy breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate man57
agement if these breaches involved the purchase or sale of a security.
It was also suggested at about this time that the private offering
exemption from registration under the 1933 Act' 58 would apply only
when the offerees possessed insider status with respect to the issuer.'5 9
Thus, anyone not possessing that status who purchased securities in a
nonregistered offering would have an automatic right to rescind under
section 12(1) of the 1933 Act unless another exemption happened to
apply.' 60 Finally, the SEC generated considerable concern about the
potential breadth of liability under the federal securities laws by suggesting in NationalStudent Marketing that an attorney, by failing to
disclose that his client had violated the securities laws, became liable
for the violation himself.' 6 ' In 1973, the ABA's Section of Corpora156. See Hoclifelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S.
185 (1976); White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-36 (9th Cir. 1974); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); see also Ellis v. Carter,
291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
157. See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1971); Rekant v.
Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,.405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869-70 (3d Cir.
1968); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269-70 (concurring opinion) (7th Cir. 1967); see
also Hooper v. Mountain States Sems. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961); and two later cases, Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1291 (2d Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277, 1281 (2d Cir.), vacated,
429 U.S. 881 (1976).
158. Securities Act §4(2), 15 U.S.C. §77d(2) (1976).
159. These suggestions stemmed largely from two Fifth Circuit decisions. In Hill York Corp.
v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), the court stated that limiting the
offerees to sophisticated lawyers and businessmen would not by itself establish an exemption; the
offerees must in addition possess the type of information that registration would have provided.
IZd at 690. Then, in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
stated that mere disclosure of the same type of information as is contained in a registration statement did not necessarily render the offering exempt, and implied that the offerees must have a
"relationship" to the issuer which allows them independent access to such information. Id at 15862. This opinion, coupled with language in the SEC's brief in the case, caused serious concern
within the securities bar about the continued availability of the exemption for outside financing.
160. Professors Slain and Kripke invoked this concern over the expanded availability of section 12(l) rescission in making their case for subordination. To demonstrate the "inequity" of
allowing rescinding shareholders to participate on a par with general creditors, they presented a
hypothetical derived from yet another Fifth Circuit private offering case, Henderson v. Hayden,
Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972), involving a sale of securities to an experienced investor
who managed a personal investment portfolio valued at several million dollars. The hypothetical
raised the possibility that a sophisticated investor with full access to registration information could
rescind and share with contract creditors simply because the issuer could not carry the burden of
proof that each of the other offerees possessed comparable sophistication and access. Slain &
Kripke, supra note 44, at 263-65.
161. Complaint at 48, SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C., complaint filed Feb. 3, 1972).
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tion, Banking and Business Law titled these and other developments
the "Revolution in Securities Regulation."'' 62 Although over the next
few years the United States Supreme Court and the SEC would reverse
many of the trends that underlay this description, 63 these developments were unforeseen when Professors Slain and Kripke and the
Bankruptcy Commission began to advocate the subordination doctrine.
Throughout this period, and continuing to the present, an important aspect of the expansion of federal securities law liability to attain
regulatory goals has been a broadening of the sorts of statements and
representations that are considered actionable. The various antifraud
provisions contained in the laws prohibit not only outright falsehoods
but also statements that may be literally true but are nontheless misleading.t64 The SEC and the courts have employed these provisions to
control situations that fall short of "fraud" in the more traditional and
colorful sense conjured up by the promoter's liability cases at the turn
of the century. For example, one court held that a registration statement and prospectus created section 11 liability by failing to describe in
clear terms the amount and the implications of a proposed takeovertarget insurance company's excess reserves.1 65 Other courts held disclosure materials misleading because important facts, although discernible from a reading of the materials as a whole, were in effect "buried"
when they should have been "highlighted" or given "similar emphasis"
to a related statement.166 These holdings reveal a willingness by courts
162. This was the title of an ABA-sponsored National Institute in October 1973, the proceedings of which are published in 29 Bus. LAw., March 1974 (Special Issue). Among the papers were
"Are There Limits to Rule lOb-5?", "The Securities Class Action for Damages Comes of Age

(1966-1974)", and "Federal Regulation of Internal Corporate Affairs." Professor Kripke concluded the proceedings and cited the SEC's position that securities law claims should be entitled to
parity in bankruptcy as an example of its "hubris" and "tunnel vision." Id at 185.
163. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (both limiting the power of federal courts to fashion implied
private rights of action); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (all
limiting private actions under rule lOb-5); Securities Act § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (Supp. V 1981)
(enacted Oct. 21, 1980) and Securities Act Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.506 (1982) (expanding the limited offering exemptions).
164. This language comes from Securities Act § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1976), but the
other antifraud provisions are worded comparably. The provisions prohibit "any untrue statement of a material fact" and "any omission to state a material fact necessary in order lo make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading." 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1976).
165. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 564-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)

(criticizing use of "turgid prose,to enshroud the occasional critical revelation in a morass of dull,
and-to all but the sophisticated-useless financial and historical data").
166. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 432-34 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd on the issue of
causation, 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 994-96
(D. Del 1971), reA'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Kohn v. American Metal
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to employ the antifraud provisions to improve the overall quality of
disclosure as well as to remedy outright fraud.
Consider also the possible consequences of management misconduct uncovered in bankruptcy. Suppose that the bankrupt, a publicly
held corporation, has assets of $100 million, contract creditor claims of
$150 million, and had sold shares to the public in a registered offering
at an aggregate price of $12 million.167 Creditors' lawyers discover that
the bankrupt's president and principal shareholder had, for several
years before the public offering, caused the bankrupt to advance funds
to his wholly-owned corporation while successfully concealing this activity from the bankrupt's directors. Although he repaid most of the
advances within a few weeks and the outstanding amount never exceeded $1.5 million dollars, at the time of the bankruptcy the president
owed $1 million in advances. General bankruptcy law would allow the
bankruptcy estate to recover the advances, together with reasonable interest, for the benefit of the general creditors. The public shareholders,
however, may argue that the president's concealment of the advances
defrauded them, and demand repayment of their entire $12 million investment in the bankrupt issuer, an argument predicated on expansive
interpretations of the disclosure requirements of the securities laws.' 68
Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modfed, 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 874 (1972); e Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973) ("While
'corporations are not required to address their stockholders as if they were children in kindergar-

ten,' Richland v. Crandall, 262 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), it is not sufficient that overtones
-might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of investment analysts."); Robinson v. Penn
Central Co, 336 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1971)(message in proxy statement "too well encoded
to be imeaningful"). In commenting on the Seventh Circuit's conclusion in Mills that a proxy
statement's failure to point out that the majority shareholder had selected and elected the directors
of its subsidiary was a material omission, 403 F.2d at 432-34, a popular securities casebook notes:
"Who any shareholder with enough education to sign a proxy card would assume had selected the
directors elected by- the majority shareholder, the court didn't suggest" R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SECURTEs REGULATION 929 (4th ed. 1977). Co-editor Marsh, it may be worth recalling,

was chairman of the Bankruptcy Commission and the principal proponent of the subordination
rule. See supra note 44 and infra note 169.
167. The facts of this hypothetical approximate the situation that gave rise to In re Franchard
Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964) and Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
168. The failure to disclose the advances could be actionable under two theories. Paragraph
(e) of Item 402 of Regulation S-K (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(e) (1982)), requires disclosure
of the advances, a requirement incorporated by reference in several SEC forms. For an illustration of a court's willingness to employ the item requirements of SEC disclosure forms to reach
matters of misconduct, see United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979). Or the disclosure could be required to make other of the issuer's statements not
misleading. See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796-98 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Jos. Schlitz
Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,505 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1972); Cooke v. Teleprompter Corp.,
334 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Despite the relatively small dollar amounts involved in the
hypothetical-l.5% of assets--the activity might nevertheless be "material" because it bears on
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Ironically, creditors could be worse off for having discovered the president's self-dealing if the resulting securities law claims against the
bankrupt receive parity with their claims.
Concern over such expanding securities law liability may have influenced the proponents of subordination. 6 9 The subordination doctrine, however, provides a poor solution to these concerns because it
affords no basis for distinguishing the case involving a "technical" or
"creative" theory of liability from the one involving outright fraud or
falsehoods. Furthermore, the broadened interpretations of what is
"material" and "misleading" have typically emerged from SEC enforcement actions or from private derivative actions or suits for equitable relief based on statements in the proxy voting context, rather than
from actions for damages based on statements made in the investment
context. Courts willing to find a statement actionable in the proxy voting context, in the interest of improved corporate governance or quality
70
of disclosure, might not be so inclined in the investment context.'
More importantly, proof that a statement is materially misleading does
not mean that a plaintiff can prove that it damaged him.17 ' Thus, fears
the integrity of management. See In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 169-75 (1964); SEC v.
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp.,824, 829-30 (E.D. Wis. 1978); SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 310,315 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); REPORT OF THE S.E.C. ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRAcrlcEs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
169. The deliberations of the Bankruptcy Commission provide evidence of this influence. At
one point in the discussion, Chairman Marsh "emphasized that the number of stockholders'
claims [in bankniptcy] might greatly increase because the substantive law authorizing them was
continuing to expand and because the Commission members had decided to make all claims provable in liquidation." See supra note 139. In response, Congressman Wiggins, another member of
the Commission, "questioned the merit ofjuggling the Bankruptcy Act to accomodate what is said
by some to be bad law. Minutes of the Bankruptcy Commission, Feb. 22-24, 1973, at 37.
1-70. For recognitions that information material in the proxy voting setting may not be material in the investment setting, see Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, DisclosureofInformation Bearingon
Management Integrty,and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555, 559-60, 607-09 (1981); Address by
Ray Garrett, Jr., entitled "The Uses of Disclosure," at 6, National Investor Relations Institute
(Sept. 30, 1975) (on file at the library of the SEC, Washington, D.C.); Sommer, The SI/ppery Slope
a/Materialiy (pt. 1), N.Y.LJ., Dec. 15, 1975, at 1,col 2; cf. REPORT OF THE S.E.C. ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRAcTcES, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1976) ("In

attempting to determine whether a specific fact is material there is no litmus paper test. Each case
normally presents unique combinations of facts, and the consideration whether particular information should be disclosed necessarily depends on the context in which the question arises.")
171. Many of the cases discussed in this section involving monetary relief that resulted in a
final judgment produced comparatively little for the plaintiffs. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 584-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), damages were reduced to reflect the
decline in the stock market generally and recovery was limited to those persons who both accepted
the exchange offer and then sold the stock they received during a narrow interval in mid-1969
(about one year after the exchange); in Gould v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,78384-(3d Cir. 1972), damages were set at $1.79 per share on shares worth $41.75 at the time of the
merger, and in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(197", the court ultimately held that the plaintiffs had proven no damages.
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motivating subordination may far exceed any actual chance of a fraud

recovery.
These concerns suggest that the better way to ensure that creditors

do not bear the costs of any deterrence is to require a strict causal nexus
between the securities violation in question and the amount of the
securityholder's claim entitled to parity in bankruptcy. The out-of-

pocket measure of damages suggested in the last section as the answer
to the best-of-both-worlds problem embodies such a causation require-

ment and assures that only misstatements that are material in a traditional, economic sense produce recovery. Only that kind of
misstatement can cause an out-of-pocket loss.
III.

ALLOCATING THE FRAUD Loss BETWEEN DEBT AND EQUITY
HOLDERS

Part II demonstrated that the arguments traditionally advanced in

support of subordination do not justify discriminating against securities
law claims by contemporary shareholders to the extent those shareholders seek only out-of-pocket damages. This part addresses the
problem from a different perspective: who should bear the losses in
investment value caused by securities law violations, or, as Slain and
Kripke would put it, the risk of illegality in securities issuance? 172 Using a numerical example, this part concludes that permitting securities
law claimants to participate on a par with general creditors to the extent of out-of-pocket fraud losses produces the fairest allocation of the
overall fraud loss among the various claimants of the bankrupt.
A.

The Basic Industries CorporationExample-Background

Assume that Basic Industries Corporation (BIC) is a firm manufacturing a "fad" product with a cyclical demand. For simplicity assume that each investor purchases BIC securities at the beginning of a
cycle and that each investor intends to hold his shares for one cycle.
Also, each investor expects that, at the end of the cycle, BIC will liquidate, repay its debt, and distribute its remaining assets to its shareholders. For simplicity in this example, these investors are homogeneous.
On the basis of BIC's publicly available financial reports, they have
17 3
uniform expectations about its performance; they are risk neutral;
and they require a 20% expected return on their investments in BIC
172. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 286, 288.
173. "Risk" is used here in the sense employed in contemporary financial theory to mean

volatility of returns. Risk neutral investors will treat equally two securities with a expected return of 20%, even though one will yield 20% as an absolute certainty and the second has a 50%
probability of yielding 10% and a 50% probability of yielding 30%.
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securities for the period. 174
Necessarily, these prospective investors can only estimate the future value of BIC at the end of its life using available information and
assumptions about its performance, the industry, and the economy as a
whole during the period. To quantify this valuation process, assume
that the investors make four alternative predictions about these conditions. Under the most optimistic assumption, the investors project that
BIC will have a total value of $48 million at the end of the cycle, and
they estimate that this assumption has a 20% probability of coming
true. Their second prediction, slightly less optimistic, projects a final
value of $36 million with a 30% chance of occurrence. The third prediction sets BIC's final value at $24 million, with a probability of occurrence of 30%. The fourth prediction assumes a $12 million final value
and a 20% probability.
TABLE I: INVESTOR VALUE ASSUMPTIONS

(millions of dollars)
Assumed
Probability Value of Firm at its End
Outcome Prediction
$48.0
0.2
Very Optimistic
#1
$36.0
0.3
Mildly Optimistic
#2
$24.0
0.3
Mildly Pessimistic
#3
$12.0
0.2
Very Pessimistic
#4
This estimation process, illustrated in Table I, yields an "expected" final value, based on the published financial data and the alternative predictions, of $30 million.175 Thus BIC's present value as the
period begins is $25 million-$30 million discounted at the 20% rate of
return the investors desire.
B. BIC's Equity and Debt Values.
Given this background, suppose that at the beginning of the manufacturing period BIC's original owners decide to refinance the entire
174. None of these assumptions, made solely for the purpose of facilitating presentation and
analysis, should affect the substantive legal conclusions that follow from the example. For examples of similar models used to depict the allocation of the firm's value between different classes of
its securityholders, see W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, ch. 4passm (1980),
Miller, The Wealth Tamnfrs ofBankruptcy: Some Illustrative Examples, 41 LAw & CoNrMlP.
-PaoBs., Autumn 1977, at 39;.see also infra note 177.
175. The term "expected value," used in its conventional statistical sense, designates the cen-

tral tendency of a random variable, here the end-of-period value of the firm. Put simply, it is the
weighted average of the four alternative projected values, with the weights equal to the probability

of occurrence of each: ($48 million X .2) + ($36 million X .3) + ($24 million X .3) + ($12 million
x .2) = $30 million.
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firm by selling new securities to the public. In public offerings they sell
$15 million in principal amount of non-interest-bearing debentures,
maturing at the end of the period, and one million shares of common
stock. From the purchasing investor's viewpoint, based on BIC's published information, the expected value of the debentures at the end of
the period is $14.4 million, rather than their face value of $15 million,
because BIC may well default if the most pessimistic prediction comes
true. Therefore, the debentures have a present value of $12 million.
The resulting expected value of the equity is $15.6 million, or $15.60
per share, with a present value of $13 million, or $13 per share.
TABLE

II:

APPARENT VALUE OF BIC SECURITIES

(millions of dollars)
Firm Debt Equity
End
End
End
Probability Value Value Value
Outcome Prediction
0.2
$48.0 $15.0 $33.0
#1
Very Optimistic
0.3
$36.0 $15.0 $21.0
#2
Mildly Optimistic
#1
Mildly Pessimistic
0.3
$24.0 $15.0 $ 9.0
$12.0 $12.0 Zero
0.2
#4
Very Pessimistic
Probability Weighted Average
of all Assumed Outcomes ............... $30.0 $14.4 $15.6
Present Value of Assumed Averages .... $25.0 $12.0 $13.0
Now assume that BIC's financial statements used in the public offering contain several misrepresentations. If public investors had
known the true situation, they would have revised their assessment of
BIC's end value because their more pessimistic predictions would have
had a greater probability of being accurate. This revised assessment of
the true state of the firm is depicted in Table III. Like Alphonse in the
Diversified Mining hypothetical, BIC's debtholders and equityholders
have actually acquired interests in a very different firm from the one
they thought they were acquiring. Because BIC's real present value
was only $18,million, absent the fraud, presumably the investors would
have paid only that amount for its debentures and shares. By paying
$25 million instead, the investors incurred an immediate loss in investment value of $7 million-a $7 million "expected fraud loss." Note that
the existence of this expected loss does not mean that the investors will
necessarily suffer an actual loss on their investment. As the last column
of Table III indicates, there is a 20% chance the firm will flourishOutcomes #1 and #2--and achieve a final worth of either $48 million
or $36 million at the end of the period, in which case the holders of the
debentures would realize an actual return of 25%, and the equi-
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tyholders a return of either 154% or 62%. As Table III indicates, despite this possible outcome, both classes of investors still incurred an
immediate loss of value when they purchased their securities because
the fraud caused them, like Alphonse, to overpay for the investment
opportunities they actually received.
TABLE III: COMPARISON OF ASSUMED

BIC

VALUES AND TRUE

BIC

VALUES

(millions of dollars)
Outcome

Prediction

#1
#2
#3
#4

Very Optimistic
Mildly Optimistic
Mildly Pessimistic
Very Pessimistic

(Fraud)
Assumed
Probability

End
Value

End
Debt
Value

End
Equity
Value

(Fraud Disclosed)
True
Probability

0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2

$48.0
$36.0
$24.0
$12.0

$15.0
$15.0
$15.0
$12.0

$33.0
$21.0
$ 9.0
Zero

0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5

$30.0

$14.4

$15.6

$21.6

$13.5

$ 8.1

$ 8.4
$ 7.0
$18.0

$ .9
S .75
$11.25

S 7.5
$ 6.25
S 6.75

Assumed Probability-Weighted
Average Outcomes ...................
Less True Probability-Weighted
Average Outcomes ...................
Expected Fraud Loss ...............
Present Value of Fraud Loss ..........
BIC's True Present Values ............

C. Allocation of the Expected FraudLoss.
1. No SecuritiesRemedies. If the investors have no securities law
remedies, the result is the allocation depicted in the next-to-last line of
Table III. Clearly, both debtholders and equityholders suffer as a result of the fraud. Under the revised probabilities, a 50% risk of insolvency actually exists, in which case the debtholders would receive only

$12 million on their claims, equivalent to $.80 on the dollar; thus the
end-of-period expected value of these securities falls from $14.4 million

to $13.5 million.1 76 The effect on the equity is much harsher: with only
a 20% chance that the firm will prosper, and a 50% chance that it will
fail and leave the equityholders with nothing, the true probabilityweighted future value of the equity drops from $15.6 million to $8.1
million. 177 176. ($15 million X .1) + ($15 million X .1) + ($IS million X .3) + ($12 million X .5) - $13.5
million.
177. To increase the illustrative value of these conclusions, an attempt was made to assign
realistic numerical values to the parameters of the hypothetical. The debt-equity ratio is approximately one-to-one, and the net effect of the fraud reduces the expected value of the firm by 28%.
Two numerical values, however, have been chosen to highlight the differences between parity and
subordination. First, the default risk on the BIC debentures is 4% (a 20% risk of default multipled
by a 20% loss upon default). Second, BIC faces a 40% probability that the final value of the entire
firm will vary by 60% from its expected value. Both of these probabilities seem quite high. For
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2. Securities Remedies Fundedby Non-Issuers. Assume now that
the investors have securities law remedies, and that these remedies lie

against defendants other than the issuer-against BIC's promoters, for
example--so that adequate assets to fund these remedies will exist no

matter what the true end-of-period value of BIC. A deceit remedy, as
noted earlier, awards investors damages equal to the difference between the price paid for the security and the value the investor actually
received. 178 For purchasers of BIC stock this means total damages of
$6.25 per share measured as of the time of purchase or $7.50 per share
at the end of the period.' 7 9 In effect, the securities laws give them, in

lieu of the more attractive security they thought they bought, a package
consisting of one share of the stock as it actually is and the right to a

check for $7.50 at the end of the period.

80

Although such a remedy

allows the shareholders to receive something even if the company fails,

it does not allow them to evade a business risk they voluntarily assumed, which is the best-of-both-worlds concern.18' The shareholders
consented to receive a zero return if BIC fails as a part of a package
example, in terms of a realistic measure of an expected default risk on debt, the annual rate of
loan-loss projections for the country's largest banks in the second quarter of 1982 ranged between
0.62% and 0.23% of total loans. This excludes Continental Illinois Corp., which experienced an
unusually high 3.03% loss as a result of loans purchased through the failed Penn Square Bank in
Oklahoma. Bennett, ContinentalIllinois Challenge, N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1982, at DI, col. 3. Generally, the selection of these highlighting parameters should have no impact on the substantive
analysis; in the few instances in which it does, there has been an attempt to note this impact in the
discussion.
178. This figure corresponds to the present value of the fraud loss shown on the next to last
line of Table III; it reflects an out-of-pocket measure of deceit damages. The distinction between
an out-of-pocket and benefit-of-the-bargain measure, see supra note 138, has no relevance in the
BIC problem because of the assumption that BIC investors paid prices equal to the values of the
securities as represented. Cf supra note 141.
179. This end-of-period figure of $7.50 per share equals basic deceit damages of $6.25 per
share plus prejudgment interest at the rate of 20%. Securities law claims generally allow such
prejudgment interest. Some statutory remedies provide for it directly. Securities Act § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 77(1) (1976); Uniform Securities Act § 410(a) (1958). For other remedies, such as the
implied private right of action under rule lOb-5, courts have treated the award of prejudgment
interest as discretionary. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Speed v.
Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 194-201 (D. DeL 1955), aj'd,235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956);
see also FEDERAL SECURrrIES CODE § 1723(c) comment (1978). For indications that a suit for
rescission or a tort action for deceit allows prejudgment interest see RESTATEMENT OF RESTiTUTION § 156 (1937); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 913(l)(b) (1977).
180. For ease of computation, the text and notes that follow assume that the equityholders
assert their securities law claims at the end of the period and that they may claim prejudgment
interest, so that end-of-period deceit damages amount to $7.50 per share and a restitutional recovery amounts to $15.60 per share. If the shareholders cannot receive prejudgment interest, either as
a result of the substantive law creating the claim or the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 726(aX5) (Supp. V 1981), then the equityholders will bear an even greater portion of the total
fraud loss vis-a-vis contract creditors than the amount computed in the text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 122-44.
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presenting a 20% risk of insolvency and a 20% probability of returning
154% on their investmeni; the true BIC investment opportunities and

risks are quite different. The law cannot exactly replicate the investment opportunities and risks that these shareholders thought they had
consented to, but the deceit remedy does the next best thing by creating
consisting of
a substitute set of opportunities and risks-the package
82
value.'
comparable
$7.50-of
for
check
a
stock and
182. The deceit remedy effectively creates a new set of four alternative outcomes and associated probabilities for the end-of-period value of the equity. The alternative outcomes are the
values of the equity under Outcomes #1 through #4 in Table III, increased in each case by the
$7.5 million aggregate deceit remedy, and the associated probabilities are the true BIC ones as set
out inthe last column of Table III. The result is a package with the same expected value-$15.60
per share--as the BIC stock investors, under the influence of the fraud, thought they bought.
(per share basis)
The Stock Investors
True BIC Stock
Thought They Bought
Expected End
Expected
Value of Equity
True
Assumed End Value
Plus $7.50
Probabilities
Outcome Probability of Equity
$40.50
.1
$33.00
.2
#1
$28.50
.1
$21.00
.3
#2
$16.50
.3
$ 9.00
.3
#3
$ 7.50
.5
$ -0.2
#4

1.0

1.0

Probability-Weighted
Average End Value
Per Share ....

$15.60

.....

$15.60

This analysis assumes that the investor can recover damages with a deceit theory even under
Outcomes #1 and #2 if he has a gain on his BIC shares. The logic of out-of-pocket damages,
which measure the plaintiffs loss as of the time of purchase, clearly allows such recovery. See
Jacobs, The Measure of Damagesin Aule 10b-5 Cases, 65 GEo. L.J. 1093, 1156 n.339, 1158 (1977).
Courts might not often make such awards, however, because shareholders holding appreciated
stock are less likely to bring suit, and the fraud may simply go unnoticed. The difficulties in
isolating and proving the damage caused by the fraud, coupled with the fact that the plaintiffs
have benefitted from the transaction being challenged, will also pose significant obstacles to recovery. See, eg., Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225-27 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.dented, 423
U.S. 1054 (1976); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aj'dmenm, 556
F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1977) (cases look to price of security after fraud revealed as evidence of its
value at time of purchase); see also FEDERAL SECURmES CODE § 1708(bXl) (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 comment (c), 1st (1976); 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
128, at 600.03 (cases discussed). When plaintiffs seek relief under the federal securities laws, some
courts may also take the position that a plaintiff incurring no monetary loss cannot receive relief.
See Morse v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (In re Investors Funding Corp. Securities Litigation), 523 F. Supp. 563, 566-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Abrahamson v. Fleshner, 392'F. Supp. 740,74649 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'dinparton othergrounds, 568 F.2d 862, 868-69 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied,436 U.S. 905, 913 (1978).
If, however, shareholders uncover BIC's fraud before the end of its period, so that share
prices fall from $13.00 to $6.75 (see Table Il), and then rise to $33.00 or $21.00 as Outcome #1 or
#2 emerges, a shareholder who retained his shares throughout the period might recover notwithstanding his gain. See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220,227-28 (8th Cir. 1975) (rule 10b5 out-of-pocket damages allowed because plaintiff made a "second investment decision" to hold
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As the Diversified Mining problem illustrated, rescission works

differently. It permits investors, at the end of the period, to elect either
to retain BIC shares or receive their purchase price--$15.60 per share
including prejudgment interest. Naturally investors will choose the alternative more valuable under the particular outcome: they will choose
to retain their stock if Outcomes #1 or #2 occur, but rescind if Outcomes #3 or #4 occur. This option actually increases the expected
value of investors' stock holdings from the $15.60 per share represented
by the stock above to $17.88, the expected value of the stock-plus-rescission package.' 8 3 This $2.28 increase represents, in effect, a dollarand-cents quantification of the best-of-both-worlds benefit the investor
derives from being able to employ rescission to renounce the business
risk inherent in his BIC shares.1 4
3. Securities Remedies in the Real World-Subordination. Now
eliminate the somewhat unrealistic assumption that non-issuer defendants' assets will fully fund any securities law remedies. Examine instead
how these remedies, coupled with the subordination or parity rules, allocate the total fraud-caused investment loss between debt and equity
investors. Under the subordination rule, the debtholders are entitled to
receive their full contract claims of $15 million before any assets may
be distributed to securities law claimants. Thus, in the example, no
matter what the remedy, the true expected and present value of the
shares after fraud; the performance of the shares after this decision had no bearing on the measure
of his damages), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); accord, Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673
F.2d 566, 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 86 (1982); Cant v. A.G. Becker & Co., 379 F. Supp.
972, 975 (N.D. II1 1974). But see Note, Reaping the "Fruits of an UnrealizedSpeculation'" May a
% roaftfrom a Transactionalso Recover Damages Under Rule 10-b5, 33 RuTGERS L.
Buyer fho
REv. 973 (1981); Securities Act §§ 11(e), 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 771 (1976) (express remedies
under the Securities Act would restrict a plaintiff to his monetary loss).
If a plaintif's deceit-type damages include only monetary loss because of the authorities discussed in this footnote, the expected value of the stock-plus-damages package decreases from
$15.60 per share to $13.83 per share.
183. This expected value was computed on the following set of investor's options to retain his
shares when profitable and rescind when not:
Expected Equity Value
Probability
Outcome
$33.00 (retain)
.1
#1
$21.00 (retain)
#2.1
$15.60 (rescind)
.3
#3
$15.60 (rescind)
.5
#4
1.0
Probability-Weighted
Average Equity Value ........................... $17.88
184. The result of this benefit is that the expected value of the investor's holdings actually
increases as a result of the fraud. Given the costs associated with asserting and collecting on any
legal remedy, however, the fraud will not often produce a net benefit for equityholders. Still,
equityholders should probably not be permitted to enjoy any best-of-both-worlds benefit, even if it
exists only in theory, at the expense of contract creditors held to their fixed claims.
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debentures and equity necessarily remain the same as computed under
the assumption that the shareholders have no securities law remedies.185 The expected value of the debentures declines from $14.4 million to $13.5 million and the expected value of the equity plummets
from $15.6 million to $8.10 million. Analyzed in terms of an allocation
of the expected fraud loss between the debt and equity classes, the subordination doctrine causes equity to bear $7.5 million-89.3% of the
total $8.4 million expected loss-while debt bears only $0.9 million10.7%. In terms of the present value of these securities at the time of
purchase, the stock purchasers immediately lose $.49 of every dollar
invested, compared to only $.06 of every dollar for the debenture
purchasers.
TABLE

IV:

ALLOCATION OF EXPECTED FRAUD LOSSES UNDER THE
SUBORDINATION DOCTRINE

(millions of dollars)

Debentures
Stock

Expected Present
Loss per
Value
Value
Loss Allocation Dollar Invested
Loss
6.250
10.7%
$0.90
$0.75
$7.50.

$6.25

89.3%

49.08C

28.00¢
100.0%
$7.00
$8.40
BIC As a Whole
Keep in mind that this fraud loss remains separate and distinct
from risks of business loss, risks also born principally by equity purchasers as traditional corporate law expects. This may be illustrated as
follows. If the worst case scenario, Outcome #4; occurs, the total business loss is $9.6 million-the true expected value of BIC, $21.6 million,
less its expected value under Outcome #4, $12.0 million-is placed on
debtholders and equityholders in the amounts of $1.5 million and $8.1
million respectively.'8 6 Adding the subordination doctrine makes equityholders lose a total of $.15.60 per share, composed of the $7.50 fraud
185. This result occurs because the class of BIC's current equityholders and the clas of its
securities law claimants are identical. Further, it assumes that the fraud remains hidden until the.
end of the period. Suppose, for example, that Outcome #4 occurs and the fraud is then detected.
Under a subordination rule, whether the equityholders assert claims for deceit or for rescission,
the holders of debentures are entitled to the full $12 million--the same result as if no remedies
existed. If, however, the fraud surfaces and the remedies are asserted earlier in the period, while
the firm remains solvent, the result is clearly different.
186. Business loss as used here is the risk purchasers of BIC debentures and stock would have

assumed if the true condition of the firm had been disclosed. As the fourth line from the bottom
of Table ImI indicates, they would have paid for and received securities with expected values of
$13.5 million and $8.1 million respectively. Under Outcome #4, the full $12 million would go to
the debtholders resulting in respective losses of $1.5 million and $8.1 million.
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loss, incurred at purchase because of the less valuable investment opportunities they receive, plus the business loss of $8.10 at the firm's
demise.
TABLE

V: ALLOCATION OF FRAUD AND BUSINEss LossEsOUTCOME #4
(millions of dollars)

Total Loss as
Percent of Investor's
Expected Business Total Expected Values Before
Fraud Loss
Loss
Loss the Fraud was Known
Debentures
$0.90
$1.50 $ 2.40
16.7%
Stock
$7.50
$8.10 $15.60
100.0%
BIC As a Whole
$8.40
$9.60 $18.00
60.0%
These conclusions belie any argument that, because both equityholders and creditors were defrauded, holding both classes to their
contractual priorities should equalize the effect of the fraud. The BIC
example demonstrates that because. the subordination doctrine permits
debtholders to participate in bankruptcy up to the full $15 million face
value of their claims, the effects are not equal. 187 Instead, the subordination doctrine shifts the overwhelming portion of the risk of securities
fraud to the junior securityholders in the interests of immunizing the
senior class.
4. Results Under a Rule of Parity. Now consider the impact of a
rule of parity on fraud loss allocation. If BIC becomes insolvent, a
deceit remedy permits shareholders to assert claims totalling $7.5 million in the bankruptcy. Under a parity rule, the firm's assets of $12
million apply pro rata to these claims and the debenture claims of $15
million, with the result that $8 million goes to debtholders and $4 million to equityholders. Rescission, in contrast, permits equityholders to
assert a $15.6 million claim if Outcome #4 occurs. If Outcome #3 occurs, the equityholders may also prefer to rescind because their rescission claim of $15.6 million is greater than their residual equity claim of
$9 million. Thus, in Outcome #3, even though the firm's assets allow it
to pay debtholders in full, a parity-plus-rescission rule will lead equi187. Even though the 'fraud does have an impact on the debentures because it increases by 2.5
times the probability of insolvency (Outcome #4), the debtholders receive some antifraud protec-

tion through their entitlement to claim the full $15 million face amount of their securities in the
bankruptcy--an amount greater than the expected value of the debentures even for the firm as
fraudulently represented. See Table II. This entitlement provides the debtholders with something akin to a "built-in" deceit claim, which serves to deflect most of the fraud loss to the equityholders, and will occur whenever the debt securities are issued or acquired at par or a discount.
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tyholders to rescind and assert claims rendering the firm insolvent. The
resulting distributions appear below:
TABLE VI: DISTRIBUTIONS IN RESCISSION OR DECEIT USING A RULE

OF PARITY

(millions of dollars)
Outcome

Distributions Distributions
to Debentures to Equity

$12.24
$11.76
#3
Rescission
$ 6.12
$ 5.88
#4
Rescission
$ 4.00
$ 8.00
#4
Deceit (Out-of-Pocket Damages)
Not surprisingly, both rescission cases distribute more value to the
equity than to the debentures because the face amount of the equityholders' rescission claim is greater than the debtholders' contract
claim.
Tables VII and VIII further analyze the impact of these two remedies and the parity rule on the allocation of investment value and fraud
loss." 8 Rescission-plus-parity would reallocate the $18 million true beginning-of-period investment value of BIC so that debtholders would
receive only $7.89 million while the equityholders would receive $10.11
million-as opposed to the amounts of $11.25 million and $6.75 million, respectively, under the subordination rule.189 Deceit-plus-parity,
on the other hand, produces a reallocation of $9.58 million to debt and
$8.42 million to equity. These results confirm our earlier conclusion
that rescission, not the parity rule, is the source of the best-of-bothworlds concern.
188. These tables are based on the distributions to the two classes under the four alternative
outcomes, as set forth beow. The numbers below reflect the actual distributions to each class; in
cases in which the face amount of claims exceeds available assets, the face amounts of the claims

appear in parenthesis.
Distributions
(millions of dollars)
RESCISSION

DEcErT
(OuT-OF-POCKET DAAoes)

Outcome

Probability

Debentures

u

Debentures

#1
#2
#3
S#4

.1
.1
.3
.5

$15.0
$15.0
$15.0
$ 8.0$15.0)

$33.0
$21.0
$ 9.0
$ 4.0($7.50)

$15.0
$15.0
$11.76($15.0)
$ 5.88($15.0)

189. See last line of Table III.

E
$33.0
$21.0
$12.24($15.6)
$ 6.12($15.6)
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TABLE VII: REALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT VALUE THROUGH
ANTIFRAUD REMEDIES

(millions of dollars)
Firm as a Whole Debentures Equity

Rescission

$21.60
BIC True Expected Value
$18.00
BIC True Present Value
Deceit (Out-of-Pocket Damages)

$ 9.47
$ 7.89

$12.13
$10.11

$21.60
$18.00

$11.50
$ 9.58

$10.10
$ 8.42

BIC True Expected Value
BIC True Present Value

In terms of the more important statistic, the allocation of expected
fraud loss, Table VIII indicates that a combination of rescission and a
parity rule would allocate the greater share of this loss (58.7%) to
debtholders. Measured by the present value of their securities at the
time of purchase, the debtholders immediately lose $.34 on every dollar
invested, but the equityholders lose only $.22. A combination of deceit
damages and parity, in contrast, shifts more of the expected fraud loss
to debtholders than does the subordination rule, but equityholders still
bear the greater share of this loss-about 66% of the whole, or $.35 on
the dollar at the time they purchase their shares, compared to $.20 on
the dollar for. debtholders. 190
190. These results also illustrate a point made in section B of Part II during the discussion of
the reliance rationale. The section concluded that because of the collection of events necessary to
trigger the benefits of the subordination doctrine, adoption of the parity rule would not typically
alter the behavior of prospective lenders at the time of the credit decision. Suppose BIC's prospective investors believe that, despite their efforts to investigate BIC, some material probability of
fraud against them remains. In theory, they could estimate this probability and take it into account in determining how much to pay for BIC securities. The price of the securities will then
reflect this "expected fraud discount" and investors will anticipate that by holding a diversified
portfolio they can, on average, offset their occasional fraud losses with the collective discounts
realized on all their purchases. To quantify this investor anticipation, assume that before any
disclosures of the actual fraud, BIC investors estimate the probability of fraud at 10% and correctly predict the actual value of the firm if their suspicions prove accurate. Under the subordination rule, investors should then agree to pay $11.925 million for the BIC debentures:
(millions of dollars; debenture values from Table I)
No Fraud
CWith Fraud

Probability

X Present Value of Debentures

=

Totals

0.9
0.1

x $12
x $11.25 (subordination rule)

-

$10.8
$1.125

Combined Weighted Average

S11.92.

Under the parity rule, on the other hand, provided securities law claims in bankruptcy are limited
to out-of-pocket losses, the debenture purchasers would agree to pay $I 1.758 million:
(millions of dollars; debenture values from Table I)
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REALLOCATION OF FRAUD Loss THROUGH ANTIFRAUD
REMEDIES

(millions of dollars)
Loss in Loss in
Expected Loss
Expected Present
Per Dollar
Rescission
Value Value Allocation
Invested
34.250
$4.11
58.7%
Debentures
$4.93
Equity
$3.47
$2.89
41.3%
22.230
Firm As A Whole $8.40
$7.00 100.00%
28.000
Deceit (Out-of-Pocket Damages)
Debentures
Equity
Firm As A Whole
Once illustrated in this
allocation of fraud loss

34.5%
20.170
$2.90
$2.42
65.5%
35.230
$5.50
$4.58
28.000
$7.00
100.0%
$8.40
manner, the deceit-plus-parity solution to the
of insolvency seems the most equitable.

D. Some GeneralPolicies and the Allocation of Fraud-CausedLoss.

Allowing shareholders to participate in bankruptcy as general
creditors to the extent of their rescission claims causes contract creditors to bear the greater proportionate share of losses in investment
value caused by fraud. This solution to the bankruptcy problem is,

therefore, easily rejected. It is difficult, however, to find any sound policy basis for concentrating that loss almost exclusively on shareholders,
the effect of a subordination doctrine. After all, no one consents to be
defrauded or consciously assumes the risk of such loss. Given the absence of any truly consensual arrangement among investors governing
allocations of the fraud loss, distributing it evenly would seem the fairNo Fraud
With Fraud

Probability X

Present Value of Debentures

-

Totals

0.9
0.1

$12
$9.58 (parity-plusdeceit rule)

-

$10.8
$ 0.958

Combined Weighited Average.

x
X

-

$11,758

Thus, the parity rule reduces the present value of the debentures by only $167 thousand or 1.4%a one-time reduction in market value, not a reduction of 1.4% on the debentures! annual return.
Furthermore, keep in mind that this is predicated on a 10% probability of a fraud that would
overvalue BIC from $21.6 million to $30 million and create a 50% chance of default. Few reasonable investors would consider purchasing BIC debt securities given this prediction, whether a
subordination or parity rule was in force. Reducing the estimated probability of fraud to, for
example, one percent, which seems much more realistic, causes the parity rule to affect the expected value of the debentures by only 0.14% of their market value. Similarly, reducing the
probability of default to a more realistic number-recall that even in the case of the hypothetical
BIC firm this probability was set at a relatively high 20%-further dilutes the effect.
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est solution, and a result consistent with the general bankruptcy dictates of parity. Indeed, several arguments may be advanced that such a
result promotes sound corporate law policy.
1. The Policy of Shared Benefits and Risk Spreading. As discussed earlier, Slain and Kripke's response to this point argues that
only creditors deserve special protection against the risk of fraud because they, unlike the shareholders, were not offered the stock. 19 On a
policy level, this position fails to acknowledge that the risk of fraud
inheres in the issuer's access to the public capital markets, when investors necessarily lack open, firsthand access to information about the
state of the issuer's financial affairs. All who deal with the public corporation,' not just the purchasers of its common stocks, enjoy the
benefits flowing from this market access. Indeed, the ability of the firm
to use this access to expand its capital well beyond the limited personal
resources of its entrepreneurs has been a crucial factor in the development of modem large-scale corporations, from which both institutional
lenders and trade creditors alike derive substantial portions of their
business opportunities. There should be nothing shocking, therefore, in
having these creditors bear a portion of the resulting cost.
The BIC example demonstrates how allowing defrauded shareholders to participate as general creditors in bankruptcy to the extent of
out-of-pocket damages acknowledges the societal costs of public markets by distributing fraud losses more broadly among all persons holding financial claims against a firm.192 Again, this risk is distinct from
191. Slain & Kripke, supra note 44, at 288; see also supra text accompanying notes 126 & 146.

Slain and Kripke specifically contemplated only securities claims arising from the initial offering,
but presumably would agree to extend their argument to claims based on open market transactions. These will probably be the source of most claims against an issuer. Trading market claims
bear this distinction for three reasons: first, in the case of publicly held corporations, more investors acquire their securities in trading transactions than in primary or secondary offerings; second,
new offerings registered under the 1933 Act likely present decreased risk of fraud because of the

involvement and investigation by outsiders, such as underwriters, attorneys and accountants, stimulated by their exposure to liability under Section II of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976); third, as
a result of the reduced threshold of culpability under section I1l--the defendants' burden of establishing their own due diligence as opposed to the plaintiffs' burden of establishing defendants'
scienter under rule lOb---the defrauded investors have a better chance to recover a substantial
portion of their claims from outsiders and will rely less on the assets of the bankrupt issuer.
Particularly in these contexts, Slain and Kripke's point seems lost: shareholders cannot possibly deserve all the risk of fraud loss simply because they are the victims; or because "but for" their
purchases, no securities violations could occur. In the BIC example, the debtholders and the
shareholders purchased their securities under the influence of the same misstatements; there is,
therefore, no obvious reason for distinguishing between the two classes on a causation basis.
192. The precise allocation of the fraud loss among the various classes will depend on all the
facts, including the overall riskiness of the issuer's business, the relative amounts of debt and
equity, and the magnitude of the fraud measured by its impact on the expected value of the issuer.
In every case. however limiting shareholders to a deceit measure of damages should assure that
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risks of business loss, to which equityholders will still be exposed first.
For example, in BIC's case, recall that the deceit-plus-parity combination of rules applied in insolvency would distribute $8 million on the
debentures and $4 million on the equity. This allows a recovery of
$.556 on the dollar by debtholders to $.256 on the dollar by
equityholders.1 93
2. The Policy of OptimalLoss Spreading. Spreading the expected
fraud loss broadly has much to recommend it. The modem law of tort
and vicarious liability embraces the wisdom of spreading and distributing risks of loss as a central tenet, reflecting a belief that the economic
dislocation and personal suffering incurred when a single individual
loses $10,000 is typically greater than that incurred when 1000 individuals lose $10 each. 194 Neither the equity nor the creditor class approaches homogeneity. Although there are many large institutional
equityholders, and small trade creditors and public debtholders, creditors are more likely to be "institutional" and, therefore, better able to
redistribute the loss among their clientele than are shareholders. At a
minimum, the equity class of most public corporations will include
creditors will never bear a greater proportionate share of the loss; at most, their share per dollar
invested will be equal Although as yet unproven for allvalues, this point seems intuitively
correct.
The recovery of any amounts from nonissuer defendants in the litigation may, however, distort the allocation of the total fraud loss among the classes. For example, suppose that a class
action against BIC's former owners produces a settlement of $4.4 million, enough to pay in full
both the remaining deceit claims of the equityholders ($7.5 million minus the $4.0 million recovered in the BIC reorganization) and the debtholders' deceit claims of $0.9 million (see Table III).
This leaves the debtholders bearing the full remaining amount ofthe fraud loss: the equityholders
have recovered their out-of-pocket losses in full, but the debtholders have recovered a total of only
$8.9 million, considerably less than the $12 million they would have received under even the most
pessimistic outcome without fraud. To rectify this problem, the allocation in the class action must
reflect the distribution in the reorganization. One effective way to do this is to subrogate the
debtholders to the equityholders' claims for amounts distributed in reorganization. Thus, in the
class action the debtholders would have subrogation claims of $4 million in addition to their $0.9
millnion deceit claims, and would thereby receive 58.3% of the $4.4 million settlement proceeds, or
$2.57 million. The equityholders would receive the remaining $1.83 million. An alternative procedure for coordinating the recoveries in the reorganization and the class action was applied and
upheld in the Equity Funding case. See Chemical Bank v. Confino (In re Equity Funding Corp. of
America Securities Litigation), 603 F.2d 1353, 1363-67 (9th Cir. 1979).
193. The figures in the text reflect a recovery by the debentures of $8million on securities with
an expected value of $14.4 million, and by the equity of $4million on securities with an expected
value of $15.6 million.
194. See G. CA.ABrSi, THE COST OF AccIDENS, cl. 4passim (1970) ('The justification
found most often among legal writers today for allocation of accident losses on a nonfault basis is
that accident losses will be least burdensome if they are spread broadly among people and over
time." Id at 39); P. ATYAH,VicAmous LuBiLrr INTHE LAw OF TORTs 22-28 (1967); W. PRossER, supra note 128, at 22-23, 459; Douglas. Vicarious Liability andAdministration of Risk I, 38
YALE UJ. 584, 584-85 (1929); Laski, The Bars of Vicarous Liability, 26 YALE LJ. 105 (1916);
Smith, Frolic and Detour (pt. 1), 23 COLUM. L.Rav. 444, 456passhn (1923).
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many individuals, such as present and former employees, with savings
and financial status closely linked to the fortunes of the issuer. Such
individuals stand in an extremely poor position to bear the entire fraud
loss on top of the business loss that inheres in their equity status.I 9S
3. The Policy of PromotingInvestor Confidence. Closely related
to these concerns is the problem of investor confidence in the securities
markets. Promoting such confidence has been an important policy goal
of modern securities regulation.1 96 The failure of any large public corporation undermines that confidence, but spectacular fraud-related collapses such as those of Equity Funding, Westec, or Four Seasons carry
with them a special potential for harm. 197 Many of the investors involved in such a collapse may exit feeling vulnerable to corporate insiders generally, and a cloud of suspicion may attach to similar
companies. Telling the defrauded shareholders that they must shoulder the entire fraud loss so that large banks and other creditors may
recover most of their loans will not advance any goal of restoring investor confidence. Admittedly, giving the shareholders twenty cents on
the dollar for their losses under a rule of parity may not leave them
fully satisfied, but it is better than foreclosing their participation altogether, as would typically occur under the subordination doctrine.
195. The experience with the absolute priority rule demonstrates a tendency to preserve some
participation for shareholders and other junior classes. Even in the face ofstrict contractual priorities that foreclose any doctrinal basis for doing so, reorganization plans have allowed junior
classes, such as shareholders, to deflect a part of their business losses by participating in the reorganized bankrupt. The source of this flexibility is that the participation of each class necessarily
depends on the value assigned to the securities it receives. In making this valuation under the
absolute priority rule, courts have declined to use market value or "cash equivalency," instead
computing an intrinsic or reorganization value based on capitalization of the debtor's projected
future earnings. See Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L.
REv. 565, 566-83 (1950); Brudney, T7e Investment-Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustments,
72 HARv. L. REV. 645, 672-75, 677-79 (1959). A considerable leeway exists in selecting the appropriate capitalization rate and estimating future earnings. This allows an opportunity, within limits, to choose values rationalizing the particular reorganization bargain struck by the classes. The
higher the valuation of the debtor's securities as a whole, the greater the opportunity for junior
classes to participate. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-

RATE FINANCE 138-39 (2d ed. 1979) (citing various authorities for the proposition that consistent
overvaluations occur in railroad reorganizations and, perhaps, in Chapter X proceedings). In addition to the authorities cited by Brudney and Chirelstein, see E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 98-104 (Muntz TV reorganization), 113-20 (Green River Steel Corp.

reorganization). 133 (common stockholders participated in 40 out of 90 reorganizations studied)
(1971). But see Calkins, CorporateReorganization Under Chapter X - A Post-Aortem, J. FIN.,
June 1948, at 19.
196. See, e.g., Sargent, The SEC and the IndividualInvestor: Restoring His Confidence in the
Market, 60 VA. L REv. 553 (1974); Symposium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAW. 1009,
1010 (1966) (remarks of William L. Cary).
197. See Sargent, supra note 196, at 583.
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4. The Policy of Private FraudDeterrence. Further, by shifting
some portion of fraud loss exposure to creditors, a parity rule may promote the deterrence and detection of securities fraud. Once again, although sweeping generalizations about the relative institutional
characteristics of creditors and shareholders may not always hold true,
many creditors are in a better position than shareholders to protect
against fraud. In the parlance of contemporary torts theory, creditors
are generally the most efficient loss avoiders19 8 with respect to the risk
of securities fraud. There are two reasons for this, both of which involve "monitoring costs."' 99
First, large creditors have more financial incentive to engage in
monitoring activities such as review of the issuer's books and records
and conversations with present and former managers. In theory, present and prospective financial claimants against the firm will engage in
monitoring so long as the cost of monitoring remains less than the anticipated gain it produces for the claimant in reducing the claimant's
expected risk of fraud lOsS.20 ° This necessarily bestows a competitive
advantage on those with large claims or the means to coordinate the
activities of several claimants so as to spread monitoring costs. Given
the current state of corporate finance and the economics of lending, the
claims of lenders tend to be more concentrated than the claims of
shareholders. 20 ' As a result, shifting some expected fraud loss to creditors, a class often likely to include institutions with large scale claimssuch as a lending consortium dealing with the issuer through a lead
20 3
bank---20 2 should increase the overall level of monitoring.
198. See generally, G. CALABRESI, supra note 194, at 135-73.
199. The term comes from Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,
Agency Costs and Ownersh&p Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976).

200. This is essentially an extension ofJudge Learned Hand's famous F,B, and L formulation
of the duty ofreasonable care in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
201. This is not true for all creditors. For example, trade creditors' holdings are probably no
more concentrated than those of shareholders. Nevertheless, more concentrated claimants tend to

belong to the creditor class.
202. A class of debtholders who possess the means to act collectively through an indenture
trustee also fits this assumption. In practice, however, indenture trustees may tend to be more
"passive" than direct lenders with reslpect to involvement in the issuer's affairs.
203. Some large-stakes claimants such as institutional investors, may reside among the issuer's
shareholders as well, and shifting some fraud losses to creditors may appear to decrease the monitoring incentive of such large shareholders. For several reasons, however, this shift probably will
not decrease these shareholders' overall level of beneficial monitoring. First, even under the rule
of parity, such shareholders still bear a greater proportional share of expected fraud loss. Second,
in few public corporations will the stakes of any single shareholder or coordinated group of shareholders equal that of the principal lenders. Third, if the institutional investors do detect a serious
risk of fraud, their likely response under either a parity or subordination rule will be to evade the
risk by selling their shares. This does little to directly reduce expected fraud losses--aside from
the market effects of sales on the trading price of shares-it simply passes them on to others.
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Second, creditors-and more particularly lenders-probably possess better access to issuer information. Most shareholders can obtain
only the issuer's published financial reports and the output of securities
analysts. Lenders, on the other hand, can commonly bargain for contractual rights to demand additional information from the borrower
and to inspect its books, records, and facilities. 204 Particularly if the
financial condition of the borrower begins to deteriorate, the flow of
financial information to lenders will typically go well beyond that
available to the public or to most shareholders.20 5
Consider how these theoretical perspectives on monitoring may
work in practice. At the time of the initial securities offering, the creditor and shareholder classes probably have similar monitoring positions
because most prospective shareholders, in effect, rely on the underwriters to perform the monitoring on their behalf. Underwriters have the
financial incentive inherent in large-scale claims: they face liability
under section 11 of the Securities Act up to the full offering price of the
securities unless they can prove they diligently investigated the issuer's
affTairs. In addition, in the course of putting the offering together the
managing underwriter will typically acquire a strong familiarity with
the issuer's business and its prospects and will enjoy access to its books
and records.
The disparity in monitoring abilities arises after the distribution of
the securities. In post-distribution trading, which includes the bulk of
most share transactions, the only direct monitoring on the shareholders'
behalf occurs through securities analysts acting on public information
and through the issuer's internal and outside auditors. Rule lOb-5 provides the basis for securities law liability in this setting and the rule
requires that the defendant have acted with scienter. As a result, at this
stage, there is no duty to investigate that can be enforced through
shareholders' securities law remedies. In this context, lenders might
Finally, in those cases in which particular shareholders do have stakes in the issuer greater than•
the lenders, they are likely to be directly involved in management. In that case, their incentives to
monitor do not depend entirely on the expected fraud loss exposure of their holdings; their potential personal liability as aiders and abettors also provides some substantial incentives.
204., Rights of additional information and inspection are generally broader in the case of loans
and privately placed debt than in the case of publicly held debt. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 328-40 (1971); Course Materials, ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ANALYZING, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING TERM LOAN AGREEMENTS (N.Y. Sept. 2930, 1977) (discussion of financial and business information covenants); Nassberg, Loan Documentatiorn Basic But Crucial,36 Bus. LAw. 843, 851, 894-97 (1981).
205. This supplies an additional reason why lenders will generally be in a more effective monitoring position than shareholders: lenders can legally have access to nonpublic information. The
issuer's selective disclosure of such information to its large institutional shareholders, on the other
hand, would violate rule lOb-5.
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well acquire information that leads them to suspect that the issuer's
financial condition is weaker than its public reports indicate. Until the
issuer discloses the true picture its shares will continue to trade at inflated prices generating new securities law claims with each trade. A
parity rule provides these lenders with a direct financial incentive,
otherwise lacking, to act on their suspicions and, if true, to pressure the
issuer into making corrective disclosures that will cut off the -further
20 6
competing securities law claims.

V.

CONCLUSION

The objective of this article has been to consider what, in theory, is
the appropriate status for securities law claims in corporate bankruptcy. Part II examined the arguments traditionally tendered for subordinating these claims and concluded that, to the extent the claims
represent compensation for the securityholder's out-of-pocket fraud
losses, subordination is not justified. Part III concluded that allowing
the securityholder to participate as a general creditor to the amount of
these losses results in the fairest and the soundest allocation of the total
fraud loss. In sum, no good reason supports the Bankruptcy Code's
subordination treatment of securities law claims in section 510(b).

206. See, ag., In re Carter, SEC Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
82,847 (S.E.C. Feb. 28, 1982), in which the issuer's banks knew for several months
that its disclosure of its deteriorating financial condition was inadequate. After the banks raised
this issue with their counsel and the issuer's management, management disclosed the information.
REP. (CCH)

The bid price of the issuer's stock immediately fell from $13 to $3.

